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WHAT DO WE WORRY ABOUT WHEN WE WORRY ABOUT PRJCEDISCRIMINATION?

INTRODUCTION

In debates over new information technologies, it is sometimes
argued that an important reason to protect privacy is the possibility that
personal information may be used to subject shoppers to price
discrimination based on their identity, traits, or habits. Although this
argument appears in numerous places, it has heretofore received little
comprehensive treatment. This Article seeks to explore the legal and
ethical principles implicated in the use of personal information for retail
pricing. It strives to articulate the case for regulating the information
flows between sellers and buyers because of the effects that information
might have on the prices that consumers will encounter in the
marketplace.
This Article takes its cue from Helen Nissenbaum's theory of
Contextual Integrity, which sees the flow of information as governed by
the norms belonging to distinct social contexts,2 and by the theories that
conceive of information privacy as implicating several distinct human
interests.3 Under this view of privacy, it is apt to look closely at the
specific concerns of consumers over information practices in the context
of retail markets-such as the desire to receive better prices and better
products, being treated fairly, and the just allocation of goods through
the markets-without delving into a broader discussion of privacy in the
abstract.
Attention will be given to "informational remedies"--the approaches
that law and policy can take in order to remedy informational harms.
Choosing the right solution entails difficult choices, such as deciding if
it is appropriate to restrict seller's ability to collect certain kinds of
information, prohibit specific sales practices, or whether to compel the
seller to disclose information about its sales practices, instead of4
restricting the seller's ability to engage in those practices altogether.
Before reaching the right solutions, however, the problems must be
clearly understood.
1. A note on terminology: in this Article, I use the term "price discrimination" in the
broadest sense to denote the various methods of offering essentially the same product for
different prices to different people. "Targeted pricing" denotes prices offered to the identified
individuals. "Dynamic pricing" denotes prices that are updated frequently.
2.

See generally HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND

THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE (2010) (discussing the contextual integrity theory).

3.

See JEROEN VAN DEN HOVEN, Privacy and the Varieties of Informational

Wrongdoing, in READINGS INCYBERETHICS 488-500 (Richard A. Spinello & Herman T. Tavani
eds., 2001) (cited in NISSENBAUM, supra note 2, at 78-81).

4. See Tal Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based
Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data Mining and the Internet
Society, 56 ME. L. REv. 13, 22-24 (2004); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, ReputationNation:
Law in an Era of Ubiquitous PersonalInformation, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1667, 1711-13 (2008).
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I. THE MODERN LANDSCAPE OF RETAIL PRICE DISCRIMINATION
A. Retail in the Information Age-A BriefSketch
The term "price discrimination" refers to a variety of strategies for
selling 5 essentially identical products to different people for different
prices. A few illustrative examples will suffice: setting price by faceto-face haggling; store discount cards; coupons; "buy one, get the
second 50% off' deals; seniors' discounts; rapidly-changing airline
ticket prices-the list goes on. Price discrimination methods such as
these have been around since time immemorial. However, new
information technologies in recent years continue to create new
opportunities for tailoring prices to individual consumers.
As information technologies began to revolutionize marketing,
online price-comparison sites, coupon providers, and auctions
proliferated. Observing these trends, early proponents had hoped that
the Internet would eliminate information inequalities between
consumers and sellers.6
With some hindsight, however, it has become clear that the vision of
fully informed and empowered consumers did not materialize. As
shoppers gained access to new price comparison tools, so too were
retailers increasingly relying on pricing technologies to their own
advantage and offering different prices to consumers across different
marketing channels-traditional ads, online marketing, social media,
and in-store selling. 7 The variety of marketing venues created
opportunities to tailor marketing approaches to individual consumers in
new ways, including individually tailored pricing. Some of these
marketing trends deserve closer attention.

5.
6.

See infra Part I1.B.2.
See P.K. Kannan & Praveen K. Kopalle, Dynamic Pricing on the Internet:

Importance and Implications for Consumer Behavior, 5 INT. J. ELECTRONIC COM. 63, 66-71,

78-79 (2001) (describing how consumers could respond to price discrimination through retailers
using dynamic pricing through price-comparison websites and similar tools); Andrew M.
Odlyzko, Privacy, Economics, and Price Discrimination on the Internet, ICEC2003: FIFTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, ACM 355, 356-60 (N. Sadeh ed.,

2003), availableat http://www.dtc.umn.edu/-odlyzko/ doc/complete.html [hereinafter Odlyzko
2003]; see also Florian Zettelmeyer et al., Consumer Information and Price Discrimination:
Does the Internet Affect the Pricing of New Cars to Women and Minorities? YALE SCHOOL OF
MANAGEMENT (2001) (concluding that the Internet provides a disproportional benefit to
consumers that traditionally would be at a disadvantage in negotiating the purchase of a new
car).
7.

See generally CROSSVIEW WH1TEPAPERS, http://www.crossview.com/crossview/us/

thoughtleadership/whitepapers (last visited June 6, 2013); see also RETAILWIRE, Pricing
Transparency: Can Retailers Regain Control? (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.retailwire.com/page/
10133/pricing-transparency-can-retailers-regain-control.

WHATDO WE WORRYABOUT WHEN WE WORRYABOUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION?

1. Consumer Identification and Tracking
Targeting marketing efforts and prices at different consumers
requires an ability to identify consumers and learn something about
their tastes by observing their behavior. Consumers can be identified
through their credit card information, store discount cards, or by asking
them to provide a postal code or address. Online consumers can be
identified using cookies, signing in to a website, using third-party
credentials, and unique device identifiers. 8 Once identified, consumers
are tracked through the endless digital trail they leave behind.9
Offline stores are hurrying to catch up with online tracking
abilities. 10 New facial recognition technologies allow sellers to identify
and track shoppers through in-store cameras 1 sometimes hidden in
mannequins. 12 Stores can also identify and track shoppers through their
mobile devices. 13 Some retailers are experimenting with tracking
shoppers' movements using radio frequency identification (RFID)
tags. In the near future, retailers may track customers through
wearable cameras.15
employee-worn
Once identified, retailers are able to mine consumer data in order to

8. See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Web Giants Threaten End to Cookie Tracking, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 28, 2013, 6:58 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023046825
04579157780178992984.
9. See UNITED KINGDOM'S OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, Online Targeting of Advertising
and Prices: A Market Study 24-25 (May 2010), available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/sharedoft/
business leaflets/659703/OFT1231.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING]; see also Robert
M. Weiss & Ajay K. Mehrotra, Online Dynamic Pricing:Efficiency, Equity and the Future of ECommerce, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 11, *10-14 (2001) (detailing methods that online retailers use to
continuously track consumers through cookies, recording past visits to website, and click
tracking, which allows websites to view a consumer's path as they navigate through
advertisements). Behavioral tracking methods are discussed in greater detail in Part I.B., infra.
10. Emma Thomasson, Big Retailer is Watching You: Stores Seek to Match Online Savvy,
REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013, 1:16 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/l 1/15/net-us-retailtracking-idUSBRE9AE 05R20131115.
11. 60 Minutes: A Face in the Crowd: Say Goodbye to Anonymity, CBSNEwS (May 19,
2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=50147158n.
12. Andrew Roberts, In Some Stores, the Mannequins are Watching You, BLOOMBERG
BUSNESSWEEK (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-12-06/in-somestores-the-mannequins-are-watching-you.
13. See Stephanie Clifford & Quentin Hardy, Attention Shoppers: Store is Tracking Your
Cell, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attentionsee also Dwoskin, supra
shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0;
note 8.
14. Claire Swedberg, Temporary RFID System Tracks Flow of Shoppers, RFID J. (Apr.
15, 2013), http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?10603.
15. Charles Arthur, Google 'Bans'FacialRecognition on Google Glass - but Developers
Persist, GUARDIAN (June 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/un/03/goo
gle-glass-facial-recognition-ban.
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tailor the right marketing and prices to them.' 6 According to
mathematician and economist Andrew Odlyzko, the motivation to profit
through price-discrimination has been a central reason for the adoption
of information practices that track consumers.17
2. Targeted Advertising and Online Coupons
So far, targeted advertising has been the most visible application of
identifying and tracking technologies in marketing. 18 By offering
discount coupons along with a targeted ad, sellers can price discriminate
between loyal self-selected shoppers who sign up for special offers and
other potential customers who did not.
Electronic coupons are built to surreptitiously transmit a large
amount of consumer information directly to the seller and are used
alongside data-mining tools to experiment with prices and discover
information about consumers' shopping patterns.' 9 The offer of a
coupon can induce shoppers to willingly disclose their personal
information and build vendor databases. 20 Sites like Groupon.com target
coupons at potential shoppers based on demographic
2 and location data,
combined with shoppers' self-declared preferences. '
Despite the similarities, however, targeted pricing represents a
different concern than targeted advertising. Consider a simple example,
suggested by economist Hal Varian22: A buyer wishing to buy an apple
in the market would not hesitate to tell the vendor that she specifically
wants a Jonathan apple because the vendor could immediately find for
her the Jonathan apple she wants (if he has it). However, a buyer would
not normally tell the vendor the maximum price she is willing to pay for
the apple, because the vendor could then increase the price

16.
17.

See infra Part I.B.
See Odlyzko 2003, supra note 6, at 356-57.

18. See JOSEPH TUROW, NICHE ENVY: MARKETING DISCRIMINATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE
136-58 (2006) [hereinafter TuROw, NICHE ENVY]; OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, supra note 9, at

14-26; see generally

JOSEPH TUROw, BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW

MEDIA WORLD (1997).

19. See Stephanie Clifford, Web Coupons Know Lots About You, and They Tell, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/17/business/media/17coupon.html?pa
gewanted=all&_r-0#.
20. OSCAR H. GANDY JR., THE PANOPTIC SORT - A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PERSONAL
INFORMATION 68-70 (1993).

21. See Kathryn Tuggle, Daily-DealSites: Worth the Bargain,Fox Bus. (July 19, 2011),
http://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/2011/07/19/daily-deal-sites-worth-bargain-or-sig
ning-your-life-away/.
22. Hal R. Varian, Economic Aspects of Personal Privacy, in INTERNET POLICY AND
ECONOMICS: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 101-02 (William H. Lehr & Lorenzo Maria

Pupillo eds., 2009).
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accordingly. 23 This example neatly demonstrates that consumers and
sellers are natural adversaries over price, even if they share mutual
interests in other areas of marketing and advertising.
3. Dynamic Pricing
The term "dynamic pricing," sometimes conflated with price
discrimination, denotes any frequent adjustments and fluctuations of
posted prices. 24 In the past, sellers adjusted their posted prices every few
weeks or months; but today's retailers are able to adjust their prices
automatically check competitor
every few hours, thanks to tools that
25
bots.
price-comparison
using
prices
While not all dynamic pricing is personally targeted, it is possible to
tailor posted prices to individual buyers online.26 -As we shall see, the
ability to automatically change the posted price for each individual
shopper without the shopper's knowledge is perhaps the most troubling
form of price discrimination to consumers.
4. Consumer Relationship Management
Consumer Relationship Management (CRM) refers to technological
tools for managing ongoing and individualized marketing interactions
with customers. 7 These may include customizing products, interacting
with customers via social media, tailoring levels of customer service,
and targeting discounts. 28 The premise behind CRM is that it is better to
retain loyal high-value customers over time through sustainable
than to constantly acquire new customers to replace lost
relationships
9
ones.

2

23. Id.
24. See Kannan & Kopalle, supra note 6, at 63; see also Rafi Mohammed, Why Online
Retailers'New PricingStrategy Will Backfire, HBR BLOG NETWORK (Dec. 9, 2012, 12:00 PM),

http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/12/whyonlineretailers-new-prici.html.
25. Kannan & Kopalle, supra note 6, at 64, 68-69.
26. Anita Ramasastry, Web Sites Change PricesBased on Customers' Habits, CNN (June
24, 2005, 3:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/.
27. See Samara Lynn, What is CRM?, PC MAG. (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.pcmag.
com/article2/0,2817,2391297,00.asp.
28. See Bang Nguyen, The Dark Side of Customer Relationship Management: Exploring
the Underlying Reasons for Pitfalls, Exploitation and Unfairness, DATABASE MARKETING &
CUSTOMER STRATEGY MANAGEMENT, Mar. 2012, at 56, 58-59 (2012).
29. See generally id. at 56-70; AxCIOM CORPORATION 'EXCUSE ME, HAVE WE MET
BEFORE'? How KNOWLEDGE-BASED CUSTOMER RECOGNITION HELPS You REALLY KNOW YouR
CUSTOMER (2011).
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B. PricingPractices Using PersonalInformation

In 2000, shoppers were astonished to discover that Amazon had sold
identical DVDs at different posted prices to different shoppers on its
website.30 Following the media scandal, Amazon apologized for what it
called a "price test" and offered refunds to those who paid the higher
prices. 3 ! Amazon maintained that the prices shown to shoppers were
completely random. 32 However, many suspected that Amazon was

engaging in targeted dynamic pricing. RThis event was one of the first
major news stories to draw public attention towards dynamic pricing
and price discrimination in the information age. Subsequent media
coverage continues to reflect distrust towards firms that secretly engage
in price discrimination using consumer's personal information. 34 Since
then, very few retailers have adopted online dynamic pricing of the kind
attempted

by

Amazon.

An

empirical

study

of

online

price

discrimination by Mikians et al. conducted in 2012 examined a sample
of 200 retail sites, and observed very
35 few instances of targeted dynamic
pricing on the inspected websites.
Nonetheless, since the Amazon episode, many marketing scholars,
economists, and legal scholars have noted that other forms of price

discrimination are becoming more widespread and are increasingly
reliant on consumer's personal information. 36 While the trend towards
30. David Streitfeld, On the Web, Price Tags Blur, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2000, at A01.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see Bezos Calls Amazon Experiment 'a Mistake' PUGET SOUND Bus. J. (Sept. 28,
2000, 3:26 PM), http://www.bizjournals.comI/seattle/stories/2000/09/25/daily2 I.html.
34. See, e.g., Editorial, Frequent Fliers, Prepare to Pay More, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/04/opinion/frequent-fliers-prepare-to-pay-more.html?_
r-0; Kevin Drum, Why You Should Be Wary of Price Discrimination in the Retail World,
MOTHER JONES (Aug. 13, 2012, 5:13 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/
2012/08/price-discrimination; Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out A Girl Was Pregnant
Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-fa
ther-did/; see also Ramasastry, supra note 26; Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the
Consumer Genome, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/technol
ogy/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html?pagewanted=all;
see also
Scott Woolly, I Got It Cheaper than You, FORBES (Nov. 2, 1998, 12:00 AM), http://
www.forbes.com/forbes/1998/1102/6210082a.html.
35. Jakub Mikians et al., Detecting Price and Search Discrimination on the Internet,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11 TH ACM WORKSHOP ON HOT ToPics IN NETWORKS 79, 79-80, 82-84
(Oct. 2012).
36. See, e.g., Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Prices on Purchase
History, 24 MARKETING Sci. 367, 367-69 (2005); see also Odlyzko 2003, supra note 6, at 6-7;
Curtis R. Taylor, Consumer Privacy and the Marketfor Consumer Information 35 RAND J.
ECON. 631, 631-33 (2004); Daniel D. Bamhizer, Propertization Metaphors for Bargaining
Power and Control of the Self in the Information Age, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 69, 75-79 (2006);
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more individualized marketing is undeniable, the impression that
personalized data-driven pricing is becoming widespread largely rests
on anecdotal evidence. Some claims about marketers' ability to predict
shoppers' wants and willingness to pay are almost certainly hype. More
empirical research is needed to understand how prevalent price
discrimination methods really are and precisely how they use consumer
personal information.
It is the concern over consumer privacy in today's retail
environment, more than concern over price discrimination, which has

prompted the U.S. Congress 37 and the Federal Trade Commission 38 to

seek answers from the retailers and data brokers about the ways in
which they gather and use consumer information. As this article will
argue, the impact of information practices on pricing should be part of
their agenda as well.
Although public knowledge about data-driven pricing is incomplete,
a number of methods stand out.
1. Data Mining and Consumer Profiling
One such method is to target prices based on detailed personal
profiles of shoppers. The wealth of data gathered through tracking
technologies can be combined with advanced data-mining techniques in
order to discover associations and connections between demographic
characteristics and preferences for products, or to predict consumers'
reactions to changes in price or special deals. 39 These technologies
make it theoretically possible to apply sophisticated pricing models to
individual consumer profiles through automated price-setting systems in

see also Weiss & Mehrotra, supra note 9, at 10-14; see also Mark Klock, Unconscionability

andPrice Discrimination66 TENN. L. REv. 317, 330-31 (2002); Rajiv Dewan et al., Adoption of
Internet-Based Product Customization and Pricing Strategies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 33D
ANNUAL HAWAII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES, 1, 1-2 (2000); Joseph

Turow et al., Open to Exploitation: America's Shoppers Online and Offline 6-12, (Annenberg
Sch. of Comm., Working Paper, 2005), availableat http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/35.
37. Natasha Singer, Senator Intensifies Probe of Data Brokers, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG
(Oct. 24, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://bits.blogs. nytimes.com/2013/10/24/senator-intensifies-probeof-data-brokers/?_r=0.
38. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS

47 (2012), available at

http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf; Press Release, Federal Trade Commission,
FTC to Study Data Broker Industry's Collection and Use of Consumer Data (Dec. 18, 2012),
availableat http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/12/databrokers. shtm.
39. See Alexander Fumas, Everything You Wanted to Know about Data Mining but Were

Afraid to Ask, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2012, 11:33 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2012/04/everything-you-wanted-to-know-about-data-mining-but-were-afraid-to-ask/255
388/.
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40

order to target personalized prices to individual consumers.
Recent decades have seen the growth of consumer data brokers into
a multi-billion dollar industry. Each data broker has its own special
recipe for combining data sources and marketing strategies: Acxiom
Corporation, one of the largest data brokers, obtains its information
from publicly available records, commercial entities, and retailer
records of consumers' purchases. 4 ' It also reportedly collects
information on user queries and habits from search engines and social
media. 42 Credit reporting agency Experian focuses its data-gathering
attention on consumer's "life-event triggers"; Equifax, also a credit
reporting agency, uses detailed salary and paystub information to profile
consumer wealth.43 Targeted advertising provider Epsilon discovers
people's interests through their reading habits and cause donations,
among other sources.4 4 Datalogix collects vast information on consumer
purchases from store loyalty cards and retailer records, including
information on health-related purchases.45 Consumer data broker
eBureau combines thousands of data variables to provide "e-scores" of
consumers' estimated buying power. 46 Google's advertising networks
AdSense and AdWords target customers based on users' Google search
queries, Gmail accounts, and activity on its services. 47 Social networks
such as Facebook use data that users share about themselves and others
information provided from apps
through social interactions, as well as
48
platform.
their
use
who
and affiliates
Yet for all their sophistication, experience reveals that data brokers'
40. See Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM How WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 123-28 (2013); see also Gregory E. Smith
& Michael S. Rimler, Will You Be Mined? Ethical Considerationsof Opt-In Loyalty Programs
and Price Discrimination, 10 ISSUES IN INFO. Sys. 204, 204-08 (2009); see also Furnas, supra
note 39; Understanding Predictive Analytics, FICO, http://www.fico.com/en/resources/
predictive-analytics/understanding-predictive-analytics/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
41. Dan Tynan, Acxiom Exposed: a Peek Inside One of the World's Largest Data
Brokers, IT WORLD (May 15, 2013, 4:19 PM), http://www.itworld.com/it-management/
356637/acxiom-exposed-peek-inside-one-world-s-largest-data-brokers; see Singer, supra note
34.
42. Lois Beckett, Everything We Know About What Data Brokers Know About You,
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 13, 2013, 11:21 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/everything-weknow-about-what-data-brokers-know-about-you.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Natasha Singer, Secret E-Scores Chart Consumers'BuyingPower, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/electronic-scores-rank-consumers-bypotential-value.html?_r=0 [hereinafter, Singer, Secret E-Scores].
47. See AdSense, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/adsense/start/ (last visited Aug. 4,
2013); AdWords, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/adwords/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
48. Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/fulldata_ usepolicy, (last
updated Nov. 15, 2013).
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49
consumer profiles are often inaccurate, sometimes far off the mark.
This in itself can be a source of consumer dissatisfaction and
problems.5 °
Consumer data brokers operate under a heavy mantle of secrecy
about the sources of their information, the ways they build consumer
profiles, and the clients to whom they sell them. 5 ' Some data brokers
cookies. 52
allow consumers to opt-out of being tracked online by online
But only a handful of data brokers offer consumers a limited ability to
view the profiles that data-brokers have collected about them, a chance
to correct them, or the choice to opt-out of receiving targeted
marketing.53
The algorithms used by data brokers to rank and sort consumers are
closely guarded trade secrets. 54 Indeed, secrecy is characteristic of many
kinds of business decisions that rely upon algorithms, from credit
worthiness to online reputation. 55 Proponents of such secret practices
typically argue that the confidentiality of algorithms is necessary in
order to prevent people from "gaming" the system and foster innovation
and competition. 56 Whatever the benefits of algorithmic decision
making for businesses, there are serious social consequences when
decisions are governed by opaque and complex
important marketplace
57
"black boxes."
The heavy reliance of marketers on data broker's data leads many to
assume that this data is also used for personalized pricing. 58 However,
49. See Deborah Pierce & Linda Ackerman, DataAggregators: A Study of Data Quality
and Responsiveness, CSUN (May 19, 2005), http://www.csun.edu/-dwm3265/IS312/Data
AggregatorsStudy.pdf; Thomas H. Davenport, Don't Take Data Accuracy for Granted, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2013, 2:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2013/10/09/dont-take-data-accuracy-for-

granted/.
50. See Davenport, supranote 49.
51.

Beckett, supranote 42; Singer, Secret E-Scores, supra note 46.

52. One such opportunity is the new initiative by the Digital Advertising Alliance to
allow opt-out of tracking cookies. See Frequently Asked Questions, YOUR ADCHOICES,
http://www.yourad choices.com/faq.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
53. See ACXOM CORPORATION, https://aboutthedata.com/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014); see
also Adam Tanner, Data Firms Nix Showing You Dossier They Keep on You, FORBES (Oct. 18,

2013, 10:19 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/10/18/firms-nix-showing-youdossier-they-keep-on-you/; see also Settingsfor Google Ads, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/

settings/ads (last visited Feb. 23, 2014); see also Power to the People, BLUE KAI,
www.bluekai.com/consumers.php (last visited Feb. 23, 2014); see also Rapleaf Opt-out,
RAPLEAF, http://www.rapleaf.com/opt-out/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2013).
54. See Frank Pasquale, The Emperor's New Codes: Reputation and Search Algorithms
in the Finance Sector 6 (Apr. 16, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author),
available at http://governingalgorithms.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/2-paper-pasquale.pdf.

55.

Id. at 3.

56.

Id. at 27.

57. Id. at 4.
58.

See Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, ConditioningPriceson Purchase History,
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because of the prevailing secrecy in the consumer data industry, it is a
matter of conjecture how businesses actually translate the detailed
profiles provided by consumer data brokers
into individual price offers,
59
and how widespread these practices are.
2. Purchase History
Data mining of consumer purchase histories is a particular brand of
retail data aggregation. Sellers can now instantly access and analyze
huge amounts of transaction data gathered through store loyalty cards
and payment records. Using this information, sellers can tailor
discounts to their preferred customers at the checkout
counter or offer
61
an electronic coupon to entice them to buy more.
Some data brokers allow retailers not only to reach their own past
shoppers, but also to target their competitors' customers through their
purchase histories. A leading company in retail purchase analysis is
Datalogix, which boasts information on the purchases of over 110
million U.S. households, pertaining to over $1 trillion dollars in
consumer spending and covering over 1400 leading brands. 62 The
information is layered 63on top of demographic, financial, and lifestyle
data about consumers. Here too, business secrecy prevents the public
from knowing whether consumers are being profiled for their precise
price sensitivity based on their purchase history. However, it is widely
known that stores target ads, coupons, and special offers to customers
based on their past purchases.64
3. Location-Based Discrimination
One long-established technique for differentiating prices is based on
65
the
buyer's using
location.
offers retailers
profile
of
consumers
their This
zip technique
codes or home
addressesa rough
in order
to tell

24 MARKETING Sci. 367, 367-69 (2005).
59. See Turow et al., supra note 36, at 7-11.
60.

See Stephanie Clifford, Shopper Alert: Price May Drop for You Alone, N.Y. TIMES

(Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/business/supermarkets-try-customizingprices-for-shoppers. html?pagewanted=all&_-r0; Home Depot Privacy Pratfall:Spotting Web
Shoppers In-Store, FIERCE RETAIL IT (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.fierceretail.com/retailit/story/
home-depots-privacy-pratfall-use-payment-cards-to-id-online-shoppers-when-they-come-in-sto
re [hereinafter Home Depot].
61. See Clifford, supra note 60; Home Depot,supra note 60.
62. DATALOGIX, http://www.datalogix.com/industries/retail/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
63. Measurements and Insights, DATALOGIX, http://www.datalogix.com/measurementand-insights/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2014).
64. See Clifford, supra note 60.
65. See Weiss & Mehrotra, supra note 9, at 1.
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affluent from less wealthy customers based on their neighborhoods.
This technique has been used by mail-order catalogue companies for
decades and is now part of the arsenal of online and offline retailers as
well.67 By identifying the location of online shoppers, chain stores like
Staples and Home Depot can offer higher prices to shoppers who live
far from the their competitors' stores. 6-This tactic often benefits people
living in high-income areas with more shopping venues over those in
lower-income areas with fewer shopping options.

4. Browser-Based, Browsing History, and URL Based Discrimination
Online retailers use an assortment of "rough and ready" indicators
about individual consumers in order to profile and sort budgetconstrained from affluent shoppers.
One such method, changing product search results based on browser
type, came to the public's attention when it was observed that the travel
site Orbitz steered users of Mac computers towards pricier hotels than
PC users.7v This practice, though not strictly speaking price
discrimination, has been dubbed "search discrimination." 71 However,
the study by Mikians et al. disputes whether browser-based price
place at all and found only scant evidence of
discrimination is taking
7
2
discrimination.
search
Another method is to target discounts to shoppers who use pricecomparison shopping sites using the originator URL of a search query,
while showing full-price products to shoppers who browse the retailer's
own website. 73 Mikians et al. found a few instances of URL
discrimination,74 with a mean difference of 23% between discounted and
posted prices.

The unsavory practice of "history sniffing" snatches the user's web
viewing history by exploiting vulnerabilities in certain Internet
browsers.75 The practice has led to several lawsuits,76 and an FTC
66. Jennifer Valentino-Devries et al., Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users'
Information, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412
7887323777204578189391813881534.

67. See Weiss & Mehrotra,supra note 9, at 26.
68. See Valentino-Devries et al., supra note 66.
69. Id.
70. Dana Mattioli, On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to PricierHotels, WALL ST. J. (Aug.
23, 2012, 6:07 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230445860457748

8822667325882.
71. Mikians et al., supra note 35, at 79.
72. Id.at 82.
73. Id.at 83.
74. Id. at 84.
75. See Chloe Albenasius, Web Surfing Activity Vulnerable to 'History Sniffing' Report
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charge against an ad network that resulted in a settlement order. 77
However, Mikians et al. found no evidence that different web search
histories led to different displayed prices in the websites they checked.78
II. THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION

A. Basic Premises and Conditionsfor PriceDiscrimination
Competitive markets normally tend towards a range of prices for
similar products. Even under the best conditions consumers have
imperfect information about the best available prices. 79 Consumers must
put effort into a search for the best deals and inevitably incur some costs
in doing so. 8 0 The natural dispersion of prices means that sellers have an
incentive to adopt a price discrimination strategy in order to gain from
the higher-paying customers. 8 However, in order for sellers to do so
successfully, a few conditions must be satisfied:
Firstly, the seller must have at least a small measure of market
power, even if only for a short while, and cannot be a pure "pricetaker."8 2 Secondly, the seller must have some control over the sale of
the product and the ability to prevent arbitrage by consumers. 83 Thirdly,
and crucially, the seller must have some way to segment the consumers
according to their different price elasticities of demand for the goods or
services.

Says, PC MAG. (Dec. 6, 2010, 10:53 AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,23738
93,00.asp.
76. See Kashmir Hill, 'History Sniffing' Lawsuit Against Interclick Partially Snuffed,
FORBES (Aug. 18, 2011, 5:43 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/08/18/history-

sniffing-class-action-lawsuit-against-interclick-gets-snuffed/;

see also Kashmir Hill, Class

Action Lawsuit Filed over YouPorn History Sniffing, FORBES (Dec. 6, 2010, 7:04 AM),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/12/06/class-action-lawsuit-filed-over-youporn-his
tory-sniffing/.
77. Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Settlement Puts an End to "History
Sniffing" by Online Advertising Network Charged With Deceptively Gathering Data on
Consumers (Dec. 5, 2012), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/12/epic.shtm.
78. Mikians et al., supra note 35, at 83
79. Steven Salop & Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of
EquilibriumPrice Dispersionwith IdenticalAgents, 72 AM. ECON. REv. 1121, 1121 (1982).

80. See id.
81. Id.
82. Kathleen Carroll & Dennis Coates, Teaching Price Discrimination: Some
Clarification, 66 S.ECON. J. 466, 470-71 (1999); Lars A. Stole, Price Discrimination and
Competition, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 2221, 2226 (R. Schmalensee &
R.D. Willig ed., 1989) (2007) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].

83.
84.

See Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 470-71; Stole, supra note 82, at 2226.
See Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 470-71; Stole, supra note 82, at 2226.
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B. Definition and Types ofPriceDiscrimination

Although there is no complete consensus among economists, an
accepted definition of price discrimination is "differences in the ratio of
price to marginal cost across buyers or units of a good. 85 Traditionally,
distinguishes between three kinds of priceeconomic literature
86
discrimination:
(1) First-degree price discrimination or "personalized pricing" refers
to the price charged by the seller for the product close to the buyer's

maximum willingness to pay for it. 87 The seller can make a take-it-orleave-it offer to each consumer that extracts the highest amount possible

from each transaction, and the consumer becomes essentially a "market
can also
of one" for each offer. 88 First-degree price discrimination
89

describe highly personalized or customized products.
(2) Second-degree price discrimination or "non-linear/menu pricing"
refers to prices that differ among various quantities or qualities of the
product sold, but not among various buyers. 90 Methods of second-

degree price discrimination include quantity discounts or discounts for

products bundled together. 9 1 Another method of second-degree price
discrimination is "versioning" of products (i.e., offering different
versions of the products for different levels of usage). 92 All second-

degree price discrimination strategies have consumers "self-select" the
93

of options.
price level of the product that best suites them from a menu
(3) Third-degree price discrimination or "group pricing" refers to

selling identical products at different prices to different consumers
identified by group traits or characteristics. 94 It exploits the general

tendency of certain group members to pay more or less for the
product. 95 Examples are discounts to students and seniors, geographic

85. Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 467-68. Cf Stole, supra note 842, at 2224 ("Price
discrimination exists when prices vary across customer segments that cannot be entirely
explained by variations in marginal cost").
86. See generally HAL R. VARIAN ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
- AN INTRODUCTION 12-25 (2004); see also Hal R. Varian, Price Discrimination[hereinafter

Varian], 1 HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at 600-24; Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 468-71.
87. See VARIAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 13-14; see also Varian, supra note 82, at 60102; Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 468-69.
88. See Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 469; see also Varian, supra note 82, at 601.
89.

VARIAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 13.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Varian, supra note 82, at 600, 611.
Id. at 600, 611.
See id. at 611; Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 469.
Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 469.
Id.at 469,471.
Id.at 471; see Varian, supra note 82, at 640.
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96
zone pricing, or need-based tuition scholarships.

C. InformationAspects of Price Discrimination
The success of a seller's pricing strategy depends on the seller's
ability to take advantage of the information exchanged during the
commercial relationship-what the seller knows about the buyer and
what the buyer knows about the seller.
The three kinds of price discrimination strategy differ from each
other with respect to the information they require along three distinct
dimensions:97
(1) Identification of the consumer-whether
the consumer must be
98
anonymous.
remain
can
or
identified
(2) Data about the consumer in order to achieve differentiation-the
characteristics that a seller needs to know in order to decide what price
to offer the buyer,99 such as willingness to pay, price sensitivity, or
product preference.
(3) Other information that is useful to the seller-a seller may
require additional information in order to price discriminate, such as
knowledge of market structure and distribution of price preferences. 100
A first-degree price discrimination strategy requires that the firm be
able to uniquely identify each consumer.
It also requires a lot of
information about the consumer's tastes and highest
1 2 willingness to pay
in order to tailor a price to an individual consumer. 0
In second-degree price discrimination strategies, consumers selfselect their preferred level of spending.1 0 3 Consequently, the seller does
not need to identify customers or ascertain their likely preferences in
advance and consumers may remain anonymous. 104 However, the seller
96.

See Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 469-70.

97.

See id at 467-71; see also Alessandro Acquisti, Price Discrimination, Privacy

Technologies, and User Acceptance (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.isr.uci.
edu/pep06/papers/PEP06_Acquisti.pdf.
98.

See Alessandro Acquisti, Identity Management, Privacy, andPrice Discrimination,6

IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 46, 46-50 (2008). As Alessandro Acquisti points out, for nearly all
purposes, the identification of a consumer may be substituted for a pseudonymous identity that
is more or less stable with relation to the information sought by the firm but does not identify
the consumer by name. Id. For the purpose of our discussion, I will consider a stable
pseudonymous identity as essentially identifying a customer.
99. See id at 47-49.
100.

Id.

101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 48.
Id.
Carroll & Coates, supranote 82, at 469.
See Acquisti, supranote 98, at 49.
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requires general information about the dispersion of price-sensitivities
05
among consumers in order to construct an efficient menu of options.
Third-degree price discrimination strategies require that the seller be
able to identify at least whether the consumer has the relevant group
trait that is used for discrimination, but does not necessarily need to
uniquely identify consumers.10 6 For example, a movie theater might
demand to see a senior citizens card but doesn't need to know the
person's name before it gives a special discount. The seller must also
have enough information about the correlation between the group trait
in order to take advantage of those
and its price-sensitivity
07
1
differences.
D. The Specter of Perfect PriceDiscrimination
The possibility that in the near future sellers will read their
customers' minds and glean information on their highest willingness to
pay the "holy grail" of marketing l0" has provoked a number of
academics to consider the legal repercussions of new pricing
technologies. 109 From an economic standpoint, if a seller were able to
engage in perfect first-degree price discrimination, it would extract the
entire benefit from each transaction (the surplus), leaving consumers
with no surplus at all. 110
There are some important obstacles that prevent successful perfect
first-degree price discrimination. Firstly, the ability to have perfect
power over price requires a perfect monopoly.' However, true perfect
monopolies are rarely encountered "in the wild" and are usually
captives of economists' imaginations. Secondly, even a perfect
monopolist would sometimes have to price below perfect monopoly
equilibrium prices and offer buyers at least a modest chance of
receiving some surplus."l 2 Otherwise, shoppers would never enter the
market in the first place. Lastly, sellers typically lack complete
information about the buyer's willingness to pay and cannot price
105.
106.

See Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 476; Stole, supra note 82, at 2263-64.
See Carroll & Coates, supra note 82, at 471.

107.

Id.

108.

Odlyzko 2003, supranote 6, at 356.

109. See, e.g., id at 356; Matthew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice: The Case Against
Consumer Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 559, 583-96 (2006);

Strahilevitz, supra note 4, at 1733-34.
110. Varian, supra note 82, at 601-04; Mark Armstrong, Recent Developments in the
Economics of Price Discrimination, in 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS,
THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY 97, 102
(Richard Blundell et al., eds., 2006); Stole, supranote 82, at 2229.
111. Varian, supra note 82, at 601.
112. Id.
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exactly at the highest possible price level." 3
For these reasons, the focus on the ghoulish specter of perfect firstdegree price discrimination is exaggerated and misguided.1 14 Discussion
should instead focus on the motivations behind price discrimination
under realistic conditions of imperfect competition usually prevalent in
most consumer markets. 15 Under those conditions, a seller's knowledge
of each116consumer's willingness-to-pay has little effect on the price it
offers.
E. Best-Response Strategies in Competition
If perfect consumer information is unlikely to allow a seller to
engage in first-degree price discrimination under conditions of
competition, what information do competing firms require in order to
successfully price-discriminate?
First and foremost, competing firms wish to know how their
consumers will respond to discounts by their rivals. Economic models
of competition among price-discriminating firms engaged in any kind of
price discrimination assume that what firms wish to discover is their
own best response strategy to their rival's price adjustments." 7 Inorder
to determine their best-response strategy, firms must first discover
which consumers belong to their "strong market"--those who are price
insensitive and willing to pay more-and which consumers belong to
their "weak
market"--those who are price sensitive and willing to pay
8
less.'
Consumers are seldom separated neatly into these two camps and are
usually somewhere on a spectrum between being regarded as a firm's
"strong" or "weak" market. A firm's primary challenge is to identify
9
where each consumer or class of consumers fall on this spectrum."
Armed with this information, firms are able to create a pricing strategy
that offers an effective best response to the actions of their
competitors,
'' 2
without requiring knowledge of customers' "pain points. 0
It is usually advantageous to offer discounts to the segment of
consumers most likely to switch away in response to a rival's
discount.' 21 Consequently, there are two varieties of best-response
patterns: "Best-response symmetry" exists when one firm's strong
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.at 603; see Salop & Stigliz, supra note 79, at 1128-29.
Stole, supra note 82, at 2290-91.
Id.at2228.
See generally id.; see also Armstrong, supra note 110, at 110-12.
See Stole, supra note 82, at 2229-33.
See id.
at 2232, 2234.
See id. at 2224.
See id.
at 2227-28; Armstrong, supra note 110, at 99-102.
See Stole, supra note 82, at 2258.
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market is also its rival's strong market.' 22 In this situation, it is best to
offer discounts to the "strong market" in order to acquire and retain
23 exists when
their business. Conversely, "best-response asymmetry,"'
24
market.'
one firm's strong market is its rival's weak
F. PriceDiscriminationBased on PurchaseHistory

One of the most powerful ways to differentiate consumers is by
adjusting prices to their past behavior. 125
Stores can sometimes induce customers to return again and again

after they buy once, thereby building their strong market from returning
customers. 1VFor example, a drug store that wants purchasers to return

frequently offers discounts to members of its shoppers club.
In other situations, by contrast, a seller's past consumers are its

weakest market. Consider, for instance, a wedding-dress maker. Her
clients make a once-in-a-lifetime purchase (hopefully). They deliberate
between her design and a rival's. It makes sense to discount the first and

only purchase (or improve the product) in order to undercut the rival,
but not to promise discounts on subsequent purchases.

Generalizing from these examples, a seller must understand whether
it faces symmetrical or asymmetrical demand with respect to its past
122. Id. at 2234. An example of symmetrical competition is adjacent stores that sell an
identical range of products. People who prefer to spend a lot at one store are likely to spend a lot
at the other store, too, and could be persuaded to switch if either store offers them a better deal.
123. Id. An example of asymmetrical competition is identical stores that are at some
distance from each other. People who live close to one store prefer that nearest store but not the
far one and vice versa. People living close to either store are unlikely to switch to the other, but
those who live closer to the middle point are more likely to switch. The analysis is the same
whenever consumers have a persistent preference for one firm over the other.
124. See Mark Armstrong, Recent Developments in the Economics of Price
Discrimination,in 2 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS,
NINTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE ECONOMETRIC SOCIETY 97, 102 (Richard Blundell et al. eds.,

2006); Kenneth S. Corts, Third-DegreePrice Discriminationin Oligopoly: All-Out Competition
and Strategic Commitment, 29 RAND J. ECON. 306, 306-23 (1998); Jacques-Francois Thisse &
Xavier Vives, On the Strategic Choice of SpatialPrice Policy,78 Am.ECON. REV. 122 (1988).
125. This strategy does not fit neatly into the three traditional kinds of pricediscrimination. It is conceivable that different practices using purchase history can fall into any
type of price-discrimination. See Acquisti & Varian, supra note 36, at 370 (regarding price
discrimination based on purchase history as a variant of second-degree price discrimination,
with past purchase behavior serving as a "signal for willingness-to-pay"); cf Stole, supra note
82, at 2250 (considering discrimination based on purchase history as a kind of third-degree price
discrimination).
126. See Acquisti & Varian, supra note 36, at 377 ("For example, an online merchant
learns billing information and the shipping address on the first visit. On the second visit, the
merchant can offer, for example, 'one-click shopping,' a service that frequent purchasers, or
those with high time value, might find particularly valuable. Such an offer induces the highvalue type to stay rather than pretend to be low-value").
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consumers. A seller whose past consumers are its strong market "pays
customers to stay"--it offers lower prices to keep past customers from
switching to the competition (the loyal drug store shoppers who have
points on their loyalty card will not buy at the rival drug store).
Economists have observed that even small advantages to repeat
customers,
such as
one-click shopping and personalized
127
recommendations, can have a powerful "lock-in" effect on customers.
The consumer purchase history data that is collected by retail stores is
generally sufficient to create an effective28 and profitable system of pricediscrimination using targeted coupons.1
By contrast, a seller whose past customers are its weak market faces
symmetrical competition. The seller then "pays customers to switch"it might offer a discount or improve the product to attract first-time
buyers (such as dress-shopping brides), but will not offer any deals to
repeat customers.
If the seller uses the buyer's purchase history to set prices, the buyer
is left wondering: How will the purchase I make today, change the
prices I see tomorrow? Acquisti and Varian argue that the success of
pricing based on purchase history depends on whether the consumers
are "sophisticated" or "myopic" (i.e., whether they can anticipate the
way their purchase history will be used by merchants or not). 29 When
too many consumers are sophisticated, it is not in the interest of the firm
30
to adopt a strategy of conditioning price based on purchase history.
Conditioning price on purchase history becomes profitable only if a
sizeable enough proportion of consumers is myopic.
The "myopia" or "sophistication" of consumers bears a special
127. Id. at 379-80.
128. David Besanko et al., Competitive Price Discrimination Strategies in a Vertical
Channel Using Aggregate Retail Data, 49 MGMT.SCI. 1121, 1121-23, 1136-37 (2003).
129. See Acquisti & Varian, supra note 36, at 372. Acquisti and Varian use the term
'myopic' to refer to consumers "who base their purchase decision on the price they see today,
not recognizing that the price they [will] face on the next purchase may depend on today's
behavior." Id. at 372. 'Sophisticated' consumers are those high-value consumers who recognize
that purchasing at a high price today will lead to them facing a high price in the future. See id.
Sophisticated consumers, therefore, are likely to try to employ anonymizing technologies. Id.
However, "[i]f the material and immaterial costs of using anonymizing technologies are too
high, even economically sophisticated consumers might find it not worth the bother, particularly
if they are not technologically sophisticated or if their opportunity cost of time is particularly
high." Id. at 374.
130. Seeid. at 373.
131. Id. at 368-74; but cf Armstrong, supra note 110, at 131-32 (If most consumers are
sophisticated, they react less strongly to initial discounts and consequently firms must raise the
second-period costs, causing overall price discrimination to become socially inefficient.
Conversely, naive consumers react to initial price discounts, and consequently firms will
maintain lower second-period prices. In either case, the ability of competing firms to pricediscriminate reduces each firms' profits but leaves consumers slightly better off).
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importance because today's consumers remain largely ignorant of the
effect the collection of their information might have on the prices they
could be offered.132 Tal Zarsky emphasizes that consumer myopia is one
of the general problems with the use of personal information in
marketing. 133 Consumers are unequipped to assess the various
advantages and disadvantages that may result from the surrender of
their personal information. '4 The collection of consumer information
realized. 135
often takes place long before the market consequences are
Retailers do not tell consumers how their information will be gathered,
analyzed and used, and consumers are not given tools to assess the
lead to.' 36
repercussions that the sharing of their information could
Consequently, Zarsky argues that consumers' inherent myopia is a
retailers are allowed to use consumer
strong reason to regulate the ways
137
information and data mining.
G. Price DiscriminationBased on Buyers' Search Costs
Sellers can discriminate not only by knowing their customers, but
also by controlling what the customers knows about their prices.
Consumers want to know if they are getting a good deal. Consumers
do not know all the available prices at stores and online shopping sites,
but they have some general expectations about the distribution of prices
in the market. 138 The basic assumption of consumers about any
transaction is that there is at least a rational chance that the price they
are about to pay is a good bargain. A buyer with no knowledge of
market prices would never know if she is overpaying or getting a good
deal. However, consumers' awareness of available market prices is
hampered by search costs and bounded rationality, and they tend to
are getting a good deal compared
overestimate the likelihood that they
139v
prices.
available
of
with the range
Some pricing practices allow sellers to take advantage of
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers by making it more
difficult for consumers to find better deals elsewhere. Examples include
posting high prices in stores but offering discount coupons online, or
offering occasional sales to entice shoppers who wait for bargains while
pricing higher to shoppers browsing the stores during the rest of the
132.

See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 110, at 107.

133.

See Zarsky, supra note 4, at 40-42.

134.

Id. at41-42.

135. See id. at 41 (At the time of collection, the market consequences are "far away and
indefinite").
136. Id.
137. Zarsky, supra note 4, at 46.
138. See Salop & Stiglitz, supra note 79, at 1128.
139. Id.
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year. 140 Some sellers deliberately introduce "noise"14 1 -- confusing
product information that makes it difficult for a customer to compare
prices-in order to differentiate shoppers with high and low sensitivity
to price. 142

It should be noted that higher search costs in individuals is
sometimes interpreted as a matter of personal choice: frugal people clip
coupons and look for bargains while spendthrifts do not mind paying
more and prefer quality over lower price. 143 We should bear in mind that
this is not always the case. There are price-sensitive shoppers who
nevertheless have high search costs. Consider, for example, individuals
without computer skills or easy internet access who do not shop online,
or those for whom reaching many different shopping options is difficult.
For these consumers, higher search cost is not a matter of personal
tendency but of means. Faced with higher prices than they are willing to
pay, these consumers do not look for a better deal. 144 They simply exit
the market and do not buy the product.
H. Welfare Outcomes of PriceDiscrimination
1. Profit Extraction Versus Increased Competition
In discussing the welfare outcomes of price discrimination, we
consider two welfare standards: the overall social welfare' 45 (the
welfare of sellers and buyers) and consumer welfare (the welfare of just
buyers).
Economic models of price discrimination under imperfect
competition tend to return ambiguous welfare outcomes that are highly
140. See Acquisti & Varian, supra note 36, at 378.
141. Steven Salop, The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion and
Price Discrimination, 44 REv. ECON. STuD. 393, 403 (1977) (noise includes "unadvertised
specials, random sales, changes in product specifications and packaging, product lines with
some contrived heterogeneity, [and] vague guarantees).
142. Id. ("The noisy monopolist utilizes dispersion as a sorting device to separate
consumers into submarkets to permit price discrimination."); see Varian, supra note 82, at 637.
143. See, e.g., Salop, supra note 141, at 393 ("Suppose that demand conditions are such
that the monopolist would like to price discriminate against the less efficient informationgatherers; that is, suppose the submarket consisting of inefficient consumers is more price
inelastic. Given these potential gains from discrimination, the monopolist must also discover
some method of identifying the inefficient, price inelastic consumers. Simply permitting
dispersion is such a method since less-efficient information gatherers will search less and thus
on average pay a higher price than will efficient searchers."); Kannan & Kopalle, supra note 6,
at 70 ("Consumers shopping on the Internet can be viewed as belonging to two distinct
segments: those who value convenience and time, and are less price-sensitive, and those who
compare prices from multiple vendors and are more price-sensitive.").
144. See Salop, supra note 141, at 394.
145. Acquisti & Varian, supranote 36, at 372.
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dependent on the specific market variables. 14 6 Generalizing the welfare
outcomes of price discrimination is difficult, if not impossible. 47 When
economic models compare the outcomes of sellers' use of uniform
pricing with outcomes of situations in which sellers are allowed to price
discriminate, two opposing forces become apparent: (1) price
discrimination enhances the seller's ability to extract greater transaction
surplus; and (2) price discrimination intensifies competitive pressure
between sellers, due to the increased ability of each seller
48 to match each
other's prices and customize products to all consumers.'
As a result, economic models of price discrimination tend to predict
a positive increase in overall social welfare compared with flat rate
pricing. The outcome for consumer welfare, however, is more
on the specific assumptions and
ambiguous and highly dependent
149
model.
each
into
built
constraints
2. Prisoner's Dilemma
Occasionally, economic models predict that the intensified
competition brought about by price discrimination can outweigh the
surplus-extraction effect, resulting in lower total welfare or even lower
seller welfare. 50 This outcome indicates that firms may find themselves
in a "prisoner's dilemma" whereby each firm acting alone would prefer
not to employ price-discrimination strategies, but faced with
competition, each is better off adopting a strategy of price
discrimination in response to its competitors' expected actions. 15 1 This
is expected to happen especially in situations of best-response
asymmetry.' The intuition behind this prisoner's dilemma is simple:
When competition is fierce, firms try to poach a rival's customers by
offering them selective discounts below costs, but may fail to153recoup
their losses due to excessive and inefficient customer switching.
Price discrimination can also be costly, inefficient, and reduce
consumer welfare or overall social welfare in other ways, which are
discussed in the following sections.
See Stole, supranote 82, at 2228, 2245.
Seeid.
David Ulph & Nir Vulkan, Electronic Commerce, Price Discrimination,and Mass
Customization, TECHNICAL REPORT, UNIV. OF OXFORD SAID Bus. SCH. 4, 34 (2007), available at
http://vulkan.worc.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/images/combined-paper.pdf.
149. See Acquisti & Varian, supra note 36; Stole, supra note 82, at 2286-87.
150. See Armstrong, supra note 110, at 102.
151. Id. at 114-15.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 110-15; Besanko et al., supra note 128, at 1121-22, 1133-35; Stole, supra note
82, at 2237-44; Dewan et al., supra note 36, at 1-2; Ulph & Vulkan, supra note 148, at 7, 3335.
146.
147.
148.
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I. The Challenges of Second-DegreePrice Discrimination
1. Loyalty Programs and Bundling
Loyalty programs (such as store cards, point schemes, and member
discounts) and bundling (offering a discount for two products together)
are special kinds of second-degree price discrimination of particular
interest to our discussion. Vast amounts of consumer purchase
information can be collected through loyalty programs and, as we noted,
data mining can be used to discover the distribution of price preferences
among consumers and find hidden connections between
product
154
preferences in order to design effective discount offers.
Under loyalty programs, the promised discounts cause firms to lose
profits while consumers benefit from lower prices. 155 Firms expect to
recoup their losses from the increased revenues they hope to receive
through greater purchase volumes as a result of consumer lock-in.
Naturally they offer the best prices and discounts to their previous
customers. However, these strategies are susceptible to a prisoner's
dilemma. Each firm would prefer to demand full-price for their
products, but must offer bundled discounts or loyalty points to respond
to its rivals' discount programs and retain loyal customers. This
situation can improve consumer welfare but
overall welfare may be
156
reduced, hurting the market in the long run.
2. Versioning and the Problem of "Damaged Goods"
An effective menu pricing strategy should induce efficient selfselection by consumers into their preferred level of consumption from a
menu of options.1 57 The fundamental challenge is therefore known as
the "self-selection constraint": "choosing a pricing scheme that induces
consumers
of each quality level to prefer their own quality to any other
'1 58
quality."
The second-degree price discrimination strategy known as
"versioning" involves creating different versions of the same product,
like "regular" and "premium."' 159 These differentiations appeal to
different consumer groups with different quality demands. When done
excessively, however, multiple-versioned products and add-on pricing
(charging consumers for "extras," upgrades, or additions after they
154.
155.
156.
157.

See supraPart I.B.1.
See Armstrong, supranote 110, at 135.
Id. at 120-26, 135.
Varian, supranote 82, at 612-13.

158.
159.

Id. at 640.
See Odlyzko 2003, supra note 6, at 359-60; Armstrong, supra note 110, at 97-98 n.1.
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be a deliberate tactic to
purchase the original product) can sometimes
16
obfuscate prices and raise search costs.

0

Price menus also irk consumers when they seem to offer
unnecessarily poor quality choices or "damaged goods" to the most
price-sensitive consumers in order to induce higher-end buyers to
choose pricier items. 161 A famous example is when IBM manufactured
its low-priced Laser Printer E model with a chip that cut its normal
operating speed by half.162 Buyers were then encouraged to "upgrade"
to the more expensive Laser Printer model, which simply meant the
removal of the chip.' 63 Another example was the nineteenth century
practice of railroad companies that placed third-class passengers in
roofless carriages with hard wooden benches.' 64 This was ostensibly
done not because better amenities would cost very much but in order to
frighten the rich into buying a more expensive ticket in the luxuriant
second- and first- class carriages. 65 One contemporary observer, Jules
Dupuit, commented that "[h]aving refused
66 the poor what is necessary,
they give the rich what is superfluous."' 1
J. Reducing Competition andDeterringEntry
Another welfare concern is that price discrimination can be used
strategically to restrain competition and deter rival entry into the
market. 167 This may happen, for example, where an incumbent firm
competing in a number of different markets (whether geographically or
in a certain segment of the clientele) is able to target selective price cuts
only in the market in which it faces fierce competition or possible rival
entry while keeping its prices higher where it enjoys greater market
power. 168 The threat of selective price cuts thus deters the entry of169a
rival who cannot compete with the firm on all market segments.
Similarly, a firm can strategically use selective bundled discounts, tying
arrangements and loyalty programs to deter a rival's discounts, thereby
discouraging discounts overall and keeping prices high across the

160. Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, Search, Obfuscation, and Price Elasticities on
the Internet, 77 ECONOMETRICA 427, 429-32 (2009).
161. Id. at435.
162. Odlyzko 2003, supra note 6, at 361.
163. Raymond J. Deneckere & R. Preston McAfee, Damaged Goods, 5 J. ECON. & MGMT.
STRATEGY 149, 153-54 (1996).

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Odlyzko 2003, supra note 6, at 360-61.
Id.
Id.
Armstrong, supra note 110, at 100.
See id at 127-29; Stole, supranote 82, at 2246.
Armstrong, supra note 110, at 127-29.
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K. Competition Over Non- Welfare-EnhancingInnovation
Beyond the worries about the effects of price discrimination on
prices is concern that the ability to price-discriminate leads firms to
wasteful and unbeneficial competition. Instead of competing over better
quality, more variety, or cost reduction, firms compete over adoption of
marketing tools that do not enhance consumer welfare in any
meaningful way, and may even be socially detrimental.171
Excess investments in technologies that facilitate pricediscrimination may present such inefficient competition. A prisoner's
dilemma can occur when rival firms compete over adopting price
discrimination or product-customization technologies. 172 The first seller
to invest in these technologies reaps a short-term advantage. However,
this advantage quickly disappears once the rival acquires the same
ability. Both sellers end up with lower profits and fail to recoup their
investment, and would be better off had neither adopted these
technologies in the first place.
These investments are by no means a trivial matter. By one estimate
from 2004, the cost of implementing an effective loyalty program in a
supermarket can cost between 1-1.5% of a store's revenue, while 173
in
other industries the cost can be up to 5% of the firms' revenue.
Loyalty programs also take a long time to implement, and 1need
at least
74
18 months before the firm sees any return on its investment.
L. The Cost ofAnonymity
Some price-discrimination practices require the ability to identify
170. Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 459-61 (2009) [hereinafter Elhauge, Tying].

171. See VARIAN ET AL., supra note 86, at 30 (Examples of such harmful competition
include: competing for advantages using political lobbying, accumulating excess capacity to
deter market entrants and premature entry into a market by rivals); see also Frank Pasquale,
Technology, Competition, and Values, 8 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 607 (2007) (discussing non-

welfare enhancing competition over technological innovation, and listing rights management
protection, search-word auctioning, and violation of net-neutrality as technology pricing
methods that do not represent healthy innovation but rather an arms race to entrench existing
competitive advantages).
172. Dewan et al., supra note 36, at 2; Yongmin Chen, Oligopoly Price Discriminationby
PurchaseHistory, in THE PROS AND CONS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION 101, 117-18 (The Swedish

Competition Authority, Stockholm, 2005).
173. Barney Beal, Getting Loyalty Programs Right, CRM NEWS (July 11, 2004),
http://searchcrm.techtarget.com/news/992695/Getting-loyalty-programs-right (cited in Smith &
Rimler, supra note 40, at 206).
174.

Id.
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consumers. Buyers who could be adversely treated might wish to invest
time, effort, and money in anonymizing technologies and to forego
certain online activities in order to protect their anonymity and avoid
negative price discrimination. 175 Sellers, in turn, might176invest money
and effort in order to thwart these anonymizing methods.
To be sure, Internet users have many reasons to desire anonymity
online besides price discrimination, and many ways of protecting their
identities. 177 The cost of technologies and counter-technologies are
negative externalities that sellers and buyers impose on each other in the
arms race over consumer anonymity. This is another aspect of the
problem of investment in non-welfare-enhancing competitive
technologies. As Alessandro Acquisti points out, however, there might
be room for compromise by adopting identity management technologies
that can help merchants and consumers find a balance between
consumer privacy protection and merchants' impetus for price
discrimination. 178 In any case, the cost of maintaining anonymity
belongs to a much broader debate beyond the scope of this article.
M. Summary of Main Insights
The survey of the economics of price discrimination leads to a
number of general insights:
Firstly, the ability to engage in different kinds of price
discrimination is directly tied to the kinds of information available to
the seller and the buyer. Different pricing practices require different
kinds of information. New technologies and information flows make it
easier for retailers to engage in price discrimination methods previously
thought to be unfeasible, such as discrimination based on purchase
using mass-aggregated consumer data to profile
history, discrimination
17 9
consumers.

Secondly, we must abandon the presumption that price
discrimination is necessarily efficient or welfare enhancing. Price
discrimination strategies among competing firms can sometimes cause
175. See Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, Conditioning Priceson PurchaseHistory,
24 MARKETING SCIENCE 367, 367-69 (2005). In this context, "anonymizing technologies" is
used by Acquisti and Varian to refer to any measures taken by a consumer to hide the fact that
she has bought previously, such as deleting browser cookies, using a different credit card, shop
anonymously in sites which enable this, avoid loyalty schemes. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Lee Rainie et al., Anonymity, Privacy, and Security Online, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.pewintemet.org/Reports/2013/Anonymity-

online.aspx.
178. Acquisti, supra note 98, at 46-50.
179. See Rainie et al., supra note 177.
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prisoner's dilemmas, impose social cost, restrain competition, and incite
wasteful technological arms races and competition for short-lived nonwelfare-enhancing advantages. 180 These possible adverse effects must
be acknowledged when considering policy towards price discrimination.
Thirdly, the information available to consumers about available
prices is as important as the information available to retailers about
consumers. Retailers are able to take advantage of consumers' search
costs, create confusing price "noise",
18 and exploit consumers' "myopia"
about the use of their information. '
IV. THE LAW AND ETHICS OF USING PERSONAL
INFORMATION FOR PRICING

A. The Presumptionin Favor of PricingFreedom
Many discussions of price discrimination start with the assumption
that a seller should generally be allowed to choose any strategy it likes,
absent good reasons to the contrary. Rooted in liberal theory, it is
widely held in liberal democracies that business ought to be allowed to
carry on freely, unless there are convincing reasons to regulate it. 182 The
freedom of the market is an expression of the belief that the value of
goods is determined solely by the transacting parties' subjective
judgment of the utility of the goods to them.1 83 This notion of pricing
freedom explicitly rejects "just price" theories, which date at least back
to Roman and medieval law, according to which goods have an
independent and objective fair price. 184 It follows from the freedom of
the market that businesses ought to be free to choose their own pricing
methods, including the right to offer different prices to different
customers. 8 5 The liberal tradition, we may therefore generalize, places
a greater burden of persuasion on the shoulders of those who would
advocate rules to regulate free markets.

180.

See Dewan et al., supra note 36; Chen, supra note 172.

181.

See, e.g., Armstrong, supra note 110, at 107.

182. Some of the most influential articulations of this position in the 20th century were put
forth by Friedrich A. Hayek and Milton Friedman with assistance from Rose D. Friedman. See
generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN
WITH ROSE D. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
183. See RICK BIGWOOD, EXPLOITATIVE CONTRACTS 179-82 (2003).
184. Id.; see also LARRY A. DIMATrEO, EQUITABLE LAW OF CONTRACTS: STANDARDS AND
PRINCIPLES 14-18 (2001).
185. See BIGWOOD, supra note 183, at 179-82.
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B. "ItHarms Consumers"
One possible justification for regulating markets is preventing harm
to the social welfare. Like market liberalism itself, the tradition of
welfare economics also has its roots in liberalism and utilitarian
philosophy, and traces the attempts to define precisely when the maxim
"the greatest good for the greatest number" is satisfied. The scope of
this article does not permit even a cursory development of the
foundations of these standards or a discussion of welfare comparison
criteria. Rather, we will try to ask whether we ought to generally curtail
price discrimination practices because of their harm to the overall social
welfare or to consumer welfare.
In addressing the welfare implications of price discrimination, we
compare two states of affairs: (1) a state of mostly uniform prices or
simple group and menu pricing, and (2) a state where information
technologies enable sellers to engage in price discrimination with
greater ease, frequency, and accuracy. Presumably, a change from
uniform to discriminatory pricing that was inefficient for overall social
welfare and at the same time also reduced consumer welfare would be
almost indefensible. As we have seen, such outcomes are possible under
certain 6conditions that cause a prisoner's dilemma among competing
firms.

18

More challenging is the observation that some price discrimination
welfare. 187
practices increase overall welfare but reduce consumer
Consequently, in choosing a policy, we may sometimes be forced to
choose between greater overall social welfare and greater consumer
welfare. Even the most hardheaded economist ought to concede that
practices that increase overall social welfare but harm most consumers
raise serious ethical concerns. Accepting the contrary would mean
preferring the welfare of business enterprises to the welfare of the
consumer masses, a position that is hard to defend.
Practically, it is difficult to apply social welfare standards to price
discrimination practices. The effects of pricing methods on consumers
are often equivocal and hard to generalize; price discrimination can
stimulate competition and benefit consumers but can also lower welfare
through ruinous prisoner's dilemmas. 188 The incentives to price
discriminate can encourage inefficient investments in technologies and
"damaged goods" strategies that do not improve welfare in the long run
but cost consumers their privacy and anonymity.' 89 All of these possible
outcomes are important to keep in mind, but cannot be predicted under
186.

See Armstrong, supra note 110, at 114-15.

187.

See id. at 120-26, 135.

188.
189.

See Dewan et al., supra note 36; Chen, supra note 172.
See Ellison & Ellison, supra note 160, at 429-32.
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any general set of assumptions.
Only the ominous possibility that someday in the not-too-distant
future sellers might be able to engage in near perfect first-degree price
discrimination threatens the welfare of almost all consumers. Although
economic reasoning suggests this fear is remote, we ought to remain
vigilant. If technologies that analyze consumer information become so
precise that they allow retailers to generally price near a consumer's
highest willingness to pay at any given transaction, then protecting
consumer welfare might be a compelling reason to ban their use.
Under competitive conditions, most price discrimination practices
harm some consumers while benefiting others.' 90 This is true of
customer segmentation based on personal traits or purchase history, as
well as segmentation based on consumers' myopia or search costs. It is
also true of second-degree menu pricing, bundling, and versioning. In
each of these cases, the consumer welfare standard boils down to
aggregating the harms and advantages to different consumer segments
and deciding if on average (or on
a different aggregate function) most
91
consumers are better off or not.'
This calculation is difficult to perform with any accuracy. Without
an easy way to anticipate which pricing practices will harm a greater
number of consumers compared with the benefits to other consumers,
the presumption in favor of the freedom of the market prevails, and we
ought to not condemn price discrimination as a matter of general policy
on consumer welfare grounds. 192 Unless we could create a discretionary
authority with the wisdom of Solomon to adjudicate pricing practices on
a case-by-case basis, the consumer welfare standard advances us very
little on its own.
Of course, no enforcement regime is perfect for all particular cases.
Any viable policy is necessarily confined to the general kinds of
practices that are overwhelmingly likely to harm consumers. We
therefore turn next to antitrust and consumer protection law as possible
models for enforcement against generally harmful pricing practices.
C. "It is Already Illegal (Or Should Be) UnderAntitrust Law"
In the United States, the Sherman Act 93 and other antitrust laws
prohibit commercial practices that restrain competition and monopolize
markets. It is widely held that the original and primary purpose of the
antitrust laws is to protect consumer welfare, not overall social welfare.
190. See, e.g., William W. Fisher 111, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of
Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 20-37 (2008).
191. See id; Edwards, supranote 109.

192.
193.

See Fisher, supra note 190, at 20-37.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2013).
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By fostering competition, antitrust law is meant to ensure that the

with lower prices and a wider choice of
market provides consumers
194
products and services.
Anticompetitive effects occur especially in second-degree price
discrimination practices that tend to lock in consumers and raise barriers
discounts.' 95
to entry, such as bundling, tying and selective loyalty
Firms that engage in these practices potentially face legal liability if the

power raise sufficient
circumstances of their practice
96 and their market
concern of monopolization.'

The tougher question is whether antitrust law principles should be
applied more widely to other price discrimination practices than existing
law and precedent have heretofore been willing to recognize. After all,
if some pricing strategies harm consumers by transferring wealth to
sellers-an effect similar to monopolization or agreements in restraint
of trade-should they not also be illegal under antitrust law principles?
The only statute in the United States that condemns price
discrimination as such is the Robinson-Patman Act. 197 Under the
Robinson-Patman Act, price discrimination is prohibited in certain
limited situations in wholesale supply chains "where the effect of such
discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly. .. "198
194. See Steven C. Salop, Question: What is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare
Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 336
(2009); Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Originaland Primary Concern of Antitrust:
The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982); Russell Pittman,
Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement, 3 COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L 205 (2007); Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified
Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 713, 734-41 (1996).
Compare with Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020 (1987); and ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978); and RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE (1976). The contrary view cited by these authors is that antitrust law protects
overall social welfare.
195. See Einer Elhauge, How Loyalty Discounts Can Perversely DiscourageDiscounting,
5 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 189, 216-21 (2009) [hereinafter Elhauge, Loyalty Discounts]
(with respect to loyalty discounts); Elhauge, Tying, supra note 170, at 426-35 (with respect to
bundling and tying discounts).
196. Elhauge, Loyalty Discounts, supra note 195, at 216-21.
197. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (2012).
198. Id. § 13(a).
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
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Douglas Kochelek argues that antitrust law principles should be
applied to modem retail price discrimination methods that employ data
mining of consumer information, even though these practices are not
currently condemned under the Sherman Act or the Robbinson-Patman
price
contends that "[d]ata-mining-based
Act.' 99 Kochelek
discrimination schemes fall into a gap between antitrust doctrine and the
policies underlying the doctrine." 2°° Ifcompeting firms are able to tailor
prices to consumers in ways that approximate their highest willingnessto-pay, this would extract a greater share of the surplus from each
transaction in ways similar to price fixing and may cause inefficiency
losses that are tantamount to the deadweight loss effects of
monopolization. 20 1 In other words, retailers would win a greater share of
the surplus while most consumers lose. Therefore, Kochelek argues,
antitrust doctrines should be expanded to deal with cases where price
discrimination harms consumers even when it does not restrict
competition.2 °2
Presumably, expanding antitrust doctrine to all forms of price
discrimination would authorize the antitrust bureaus of the Federal
Trade Commission and Department of Justice to file lawsuits against
sellers that engage in price-discrimination practices, as well as private
actions for treble damages, using the kind of economic analysis and
reasoning usually employed in antitrust cases.
However, articulating a clear legal test that captures precisely those
practices that harm consumers can be particularly challenging. This
difficulty can be demonstrated through the tortured history of the
Robinson-Patman Act, which was meant to prevent wholesale supplychain price discrimination.20 3 As antitrust scholar Herbert Hovenkamp
summarizes this history:
The Robinson-Patman Act has done an extraordinarily poor
job of identifying those forms of price discrimination that
most economists consider to be inefficient. At the same time,
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them....
Id.
199. See generally Douglas M. Kochelek, Data Mining and Antitrust, 22 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 515 (2009).

200.

Id. at 535.

201.

Id.

202.
203.

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2012).
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it has often been used to condemn efficient practices that were
really evidence of healthy competition. The Act has been
widely castigated by critics who see it as doing far more harm
than good to the competitive process. The Department of
Justice has not enforced the Act since 1977, and the Federal
Trade Commission largely ignores it as well.2 °4
Hovenkamp adds that the application of the Robinson-Patman Act is
a "morass of technical requirements that often hide or subvert its basic
purpose." 20 5 It has even been argued that the procedures for making a
complaint under the Act may in fact restrain competition more that the
practices it is meant to prohibit. 20 6 Clearly, if the Robinson-Patman Act
were called upon to serve as a model for legislation to combat 2retail
7
poor example. 0
price discrimination, it would provide a particularly
There is another reason why adopting the antitrust model of
regulation is unsuited to answer the problems of retail price
discrimination. Kochelek's argues that price discrimination facilitated
by data-mining is similar to antitrust violations because of their shared
20 8 This argument
potential to exert market power over consumers.
focuses almost entirely on the ability to extract consumer surplus under
first-degree price discrimination. 20 9 This type of price discrimination is
highly unlikely to succeed. The exclusive focus on the surplusextraction effect of price discrimination ignores the powerful
competitive forces that drive the adoption of price discrimination, as
well as its possible competition-enhancing potential. In practice, it is
very hard to identify clear-cut harm to a majority of consumers in many
price-discrimination practices. If litigants will be allowed to argue
efficiencies and benefits to consumers from price discrimination, as
they are under prevailing antitrust doctrine, such efficiency arguments
could swallow up any proposed rule against price discrimination.
Furthermore, antitrust doctrine is inapplicable to the ways that new
forms of retail price discrimination achieve their purpose. At least with
respect to single-firm conduct, antitrust law regards a firm's market
power as a decisive factor in its ability to raise price levels for most
consumers. By contrast, new retail price discrimination methods enable
204.

HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND

ITS PRACTICE 629 (4th ed. 2011).

205. Id. at 633.
206. See Hagit Bulmash, An EmpiricalAnalysis of Secondary Line Price Discrimination
Motivations 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 361 (2012); Klock, supra note 36, at 359-63 n.269.
207. See Edwards, supra note 109, at 575-83; Klock, supra note 36, at 378 ("[t]here may
be some scope for creative attorneys to bring colorable claims and for open-minded judges to be
receptive to them within the existing law").
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a seller to raise prices only to specific customers who are unlikely to
defect to its competitors. These new methods do not depend upon
significant market power in order to succeed. Therefore, existing
antitrust doctrine is simply too far removed from the realities of modem
price discrimination practices to be of much guidance.
To summarize, the underlying objective of antitrust law-protecting
consumer welfare-may well be applicable to pricing practices that
overcharge consumers. However, with few exceptions, using antitrust
law as a basis for wider enforcement against price discrimination is
misguided. Articulating a meaningful rule that would encompass those
pricing practices most likely to cause harm (and only them) would
prove a formidable challenge. What's more, antitrust laws protect
consumers by nurturing competition. But with new retail information
technologies, competition alone does not ensure that consumers are not
subjected to price gouging.
D. "It is Deceptive"
Still using the overall consumer welfare standard as our guiding
beacon, we turn to examine price discrimination in light the laws of
contract misrepresentation and consumer protection. These laws are
more concerned with what consumers know about the sellers' prices
and products, and less with what the seller knows about the consumer.
In most market settings, retailers typically enjoy information
advantages over consumers with respect to the product or services they
sell. To counter this imbalance, the law protects consumers against
gross information inequalities in a number of ways:
Firstly, contract law provides ex-post facto remedies to
victims of fraud, misrepresentation, duress, and
unconscionable dealing. Secondly, some consumer protection
laws specifically address the consumers' difficulty to compare
products by requiring clear labeling of prices, quantity,
weight, ingredients, health warnings, known risks, etc., or by
preventing false or misleading advertising ex-ante. Thirdly,
some laws provide consumers with the right to correct their
mistakes in bargaining, such as the right to return products or
cancel transactions. The purpose of these laws is to protect
"consumer sovereignty"-the consumer's ability to make
rational and informed choices among market options. 210
Without the protection of the law, it is believed, consumers might
fall prey to unscrupulous sellers who will surprise them with higher
210. Averitt & Lande, supranote 194, at 713.
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prices or lesser quality or quantity products than they bargained for.
Free market values generally permit sellers to engage in most kinds
of pricing schemes so long as they do not deceive consumers. A seller
should be allowed to offer products at any price to knowing and willing
customers. The problem, therefore, is how to define the threshold
beyond which a price discrimination scheme can be considered
deceptive.
1. The Moral Duty to Price Fairly
The ancient tension between the free market and just pricing is
reflected in the idea, found in ancient Jewish law that considers pricing
significantly over market price a sui generis form of fraud (Ona'a), even
without coercion or deception. 2 11 Recognizing that sellers were entitled
to fair profits, the Talmudic sages adopted a rule according to which
over-pricing by a sixth above market value made the transaction
invalid.2 12 A buyer who unknowingly over-paid could demand a return
of the difference or cancel the transaction within the reasonable amount
to discover the mistake by consulting with another
of time it would take
21 3
merchant or expert.
Immanuel Kant voiced a similar rebuke of over-pricing, and believed
that a storekeeper had a moral duty to charge all customers equally:
That a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced
purchaser certainly accords with [the] duty [the moral duty of
the good will]; and where there is much commerce, the
prudent merchant does not overcharge but keeps to a fixed
price for everyone in general, so that a child may buy from
him just as well as everyone else may. Thus customers are
honestly served, but this is not nearly enough for making us
believe that the merchant has acted this way from duty and
of honesty; his own advantage required him to
principles
from 21
4
do it.

211.

See Itamar Warhaflig, Consumer Protection: Price Fraud, CROSSROADS: HALACHA

AND THE MODERN WORLD, available at http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/price-fraud.html.

Id.
Id.; Nahum Rakover, COMMERCE IN THE JEWISH LAW 19-23 (1987) (in Hebrew). A
number ofjurisprudential rules limit the application of Ona 'a. For example, there are limits over
the period of time to demand cancellation, certain kinds of transactions, like land purchases,
where Ona'a does not apply, and certain circumstances where parties are free to stipulate and
waive Ona 'a and accept higher prices.
214. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 10 (James
Ellington, trans., Hackett Publ'g Co., 2d ed. 1981) (1785). 1 thank Helen Nissenbaum for
sending me this excerpt.
212.
213.
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Both the ancient law of Ona'a and Kant's philosophy condemn
selective over-pricing, less on a "just price" theory and more on the
assumption that over-pricing must be the result of unfair exploitation of
a customer's ignorance. The buyer is presumed to be at an inherent
disadvantage. The seller's moral duty to keep prices level is intended as
a safeguard against exploitation of the innocent shopper.
The passage from Kant introduces a central dilemma regarding
consumer exploitation: Is it a moral imperative to treat customers fairly
or merely a prudent business convention? The converse question may
also be asked: If one tried to enforce some form of equal pricing, would
this be an invasion into the private domain of personal morals or would
it be justified for the protection of the consumer public and the
marketplace?
2. Is Price Discrimination a Misrepresentation?
A seller's ability to offer different prices to different individuals or
groups allows it to take advantage of buyers' limited and costly ability
to compare prices. Pricing methods likely to take advantage of
consumers' search costs include: posting different prices across retail
channels, offering exclusive discounts in targeted coupons, and
discounting only on price-comparison sites. Pricing strategies that target
shoppers based on their search or shopping history exploit consumer
"myopia" about the future consequences of their behavior on the prices
they see and make it difficult for consumers to make informed choices.
When prices vary across retail channels or individuals in these ways,
consumers sometimes feel like the higher price was a deception.
However, U.S. legal doctrine on contract mistake215 and
misrepresentation 2 16 seems to preclude the notion that a seller has a duty
215. According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 153 (1981), a contract
may be voidable because of the mistake of one party, only:
[w]here a mistake of one party at the time a contract was made as to a basic
assumption on which he made that contract has a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances that is adverse to him, the contract is voidable by
him if he does not bear the risk of the mistake .. .and, (a) the effect of the
mistake is such that enforcement of the contract would be unconscionable, or
(b) the other party had reason to know of the mistake or his fault caused the

mistake.
Id.
216. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 159 (1981) defines misrepresentation
as: "a false assertion of fact..." According to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161
(198 1), non-disclosure of a fact is tantamount to a false assertion only in limited circumstances:
where disclosure is necessary to correct a previous assertion or material mistake of a party, or
where there is a previous relation of trust.
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to disclose information about its prices across all marketing channels or
individuals. For a claim based on mistake or misrepresentation to be
recognized, the mistaken party (usually the buyer) must have relied on
false information as a basic assumption underlying the bargain.217 It is
plausible to argue that consumers care deeply about what other buyers
pay for the same product (consider the disappointment and outrage of
the Amazon shoppers back in 200021 8). But a buyer can seldom claim
that she relied on the uniformity of prices as a basic assumption of the
bargain. Unless the seller publically advertises a price, the buyer
typically only knows the posted price at the time and place where she
makes the purchase. Buyers are seldom told what prices are offered in
other store locations, whether a coupon is available elsewhere, or if the
product will go on sale next week. Therefore, a shopper usually cannot
claim that she entered into the bargain solely under the mistaken belief
that the current price is the lowest price the seller is willing to offer to
anyone, anywhere.
Moreover, free market values allow sellers to benefit from
legitimately acquired information advantages. According to Anthony
Kronman, the purpose of the contract mistake and misrepresentation
doctrines is to allocate the property right in information advantages in
order to incentivize efficient and socially useful information gathering
and avoiding the social costs of sub-optimal shopping decisions induced
by false information. 2 19 Kronman draws a distinction between
categories of information acquired deliberately through investment and
effort, and information acquired casually without special effort. 220 In
order to incentivize socially useful information gathering, the law of
misrepresentation and unilateral mistake should not require the seller to
disclose information acquired with effort. This rule places the burden of
preventing error on the party that can gather information more
efficiently.
If we are to treat price discrimination as misrepresentation under
Kronman's analysis, we might propose the following rule: A seller has
the duty to disclose to a consumer the lowest price offered for the same
product to other consumers across all marketing channels. However,
this disclosure would only be required in those situations where the
consumer would not buy at the higher price if she knew about the
existence of the lower price, and provided the consumer cannot learn of
the existence of the lower price with reasonable effort.
Note that under these proposed rules, it makes no difference if lower
217.

Seeid. §§ 159, 161.

218.

See Streitfeld, supra note 30.

219. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure,Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14-15 (1978).

220.
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prices are exclusively offered only to a few consumers or if they are
simply advertised on a selective basis but are available to all. What
matters is only that the consumer would have chosen not to buy at the
higher price if she knew that another shopper received the same product
at a lower price. Put differently, the proposed rule seeks to completely
remove the seller's ability to profit specifically from price
discrimination practices based on differences in search costs. The
proposed rules limit the advantages of hidden price discrimination
practices if they tend to produce price differences that consumers would
not reasonably tolerate.
Such a proposed rule raises a number of objections. Firstly, a liberal
market policy would not seek to deprive a seller's discretion over
pricing strategy and advertising. Price differences might be justified by
a retailer's marketing costs, or represent different value to consumers
shopping via different channels. One cannot categorically say that all
price differences across retail channels based on personal or group
characteristics are deceptive.
Secondly, a rule that condemns differential or targeted pricing as
deceptive suffers from circular logic. The buyer objects to paying a
higher price for the product only because this proposed rule allows her
to rely upon a belief that the seller is obliged to disclose the lower price
to her. If no such expectation is created by the operation of this rule, the
buyer should accept the possibility that prices may differ across
marketing channels and has no legitimate expectation that she is offered
the lowest price.
Thirdly, the proposed rule only restricts those pricing practices that
require extraordinary effort for a buyer to discover. This condition of
reasonable effort requires a value judgment about the degree of effort a
consumer is expected to expend in researching prices. The proposed
rule cannot stand-alone and requires an external standard in order to
distinguish excessively deceptive pricing practices from tolerable
pricing practices. For these reasons, a Kronman-like analysis does not
resolve the question of how to treat the information disparity between
buyers and sellers over offered prices.
3. Frustrating Savvy Shoppers
The problem of difficult-to-find good bargains goes beyond the
question of consumer welfare, and strikes at an important norm in the
context of market activity-that a diligent and savvy shopper should
ultimately be able to find the good deal.
In a free market, consumers are expected to expend reasonable
search costs if they wish to reap the rewards of lower prices.
Unfortunately, some new pricing methods are designed to frustrate even
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savvy shoppers and raise the cost effort required for finding better deals
precisely to those shoppers who put in the effort to find those deals. One
way new pricing strategies undermine savvy shoppers is by making
price-comparison tools less effective. 221 Sellers find ways to avoid
publicly posting their lowest prices in order to circumvent automated
search bots that deliver low prices to comparison-shopping sites.222
Dynamic pricing, price-matching commitments, targeted offers and
coupons, free shipping and other perks undermine the effectiveness of
price comparison sites. 223 Consequently, shoppers' benefit from price
comparison sites erodes.
Another way pricing practices frustrate savvy shopping is by making
deals personally targeted, thus favoring the chosen over the choosy. The
more complex, opaque, and individualized prices become, the task of
even the savviest shopper to find good deals becomes more difficult.
When prices are individualized to the consumer, no one can assume
they are getting a good deal or rely on the wisdom of the multitudes in
for bargain hunting. As Ian Ayres put it, "The fact that price-conscious
is no longer an indication that it will be a good
buyers patronize a store
225
too.
you,
for
place
With personalized prices, finding good bargains is no longer tied to
the effort expended in looking for them. New York Times columnist
Virginia Heffernan, commenting on the confusing and possibly
discriminatory pricing policies of Amazon Prime, eloquently summed
up the argument:
We online shoppers take pride in being shrewd . . .
Conducting research into the top-ranked thing for best price
has become the whole shopping game. When a purchase
arrives, it can seem like an afterthought, a prize for being such
an astute scholar of prices, such a conscientious, close reader
of reviews... But there may be good reason to check my selfsatisfaction over it. On the Web, often when we think we're at
our most savvy - conducting research, comparison-shopping,
deal getting - we're engaged not in strategic critical thinking
221. Kannan & Kopalle, supra note 6, at 63-68.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.at 70; see also Ellison & Ellison, supra note 160 (showing their study of
comparison shopping site Pricewatch.com suggests that various price obfuscation techniques by
retailers frustrate effective comparison-shopping online); Annie Lowrey, How Online Retailers
Stay a Step Ahead of Comparison Shoppers, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2010, 5:32 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/12/1 I/AR2010121102435.html;
Odlyzko 2003, supra note 6, at 356-57.
225. IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS: WHY THINKING BY THE NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO
BE SMART 173 (2007).
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but in an infotainment ritual akin to watching commercial TV.
At best, trying to beat the Web may make us spend a little
more; at worst, it may deepen our involvement with a game
that's rigged against US.226
4. Reconceiving the Purpose of Consumer Protection
Marketing techniques that create and exploit consumers' high search
costs undermine the ability to compare prices and can lower overall
welfare and harm consumers. They can also be very annoying and
frustrating. They allow sellers to induce consumer miscalculation and
extract a greater profit without strictly misrepresenting information
about the product. When good deals are hard to find, the consumer is
not deceived about the product itself or its subjective value as measured
by her willingness to pay. Rather, the consumer is deceived (or is
induced to make a mistake) about her comparative position in the
market, the availability of better options, and her relative benefit from
the bargain.
Indeed, some scholars argue that the cause of consumer protection
should take notice of these concerns beyond a narrow focus on
consumer's rationality and vulnerability and respond to the broader
social forces that shape the power allocation between seller and
buyer. 227 Under this view of consumer protection, the purpose of
consumer information regulation is to protect shoppers' ability to resist
228
the growing power of the retailers to shape marketplace behavior.
The need to protect the individual's ability to choose is not tied solely to
the interest of overall social welfare, but touches upon interests of
human autonomy and229 the value accorded to consumers and
consumerism in society.
5. Price-Labeling to Combat Price Discrimination Practices
The laws that mandate clear labeling of unit prices and prices per
measure 23 are good examples of consumer protection measures that
facilitate easier consumer decision-making, beyond merely protecting
consumers against misrepresented facts about products. Considering the
226. Virginia Heffernan, Amazon's Prime Suspect, N.Y. TIMEs (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/08/magazine/08FOB-medium-t.html? r- I &.
227. See Barnhizer, supra note 36, at 90; lIrN RAMSAY, ConsumerProtection in the Era of
Information Capitalism, in CONSUMER LAW IN THE INFORMATION SOcIETY 62-64 (Thomas

Wilhelmsson et al. eds., 2001).
228. RAMSAY supra note 227, at 62-64.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., N.Y. AGM. LAW §§ 197-b, 214-h (2013); 1 C.R.R.-N.Y. §§ 345.1-345.7
(2013).
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popularity of price-labeling laws and other similar laws that empower
consumers, one may be tempted to adopt a similar law against price
discrimination that would compel retailers to clearly display the lowest
offered price or disclose their pricing practices. However, such a law
would almost amount to coercing uniform prices across marketing
channels; there would be little sense in offering consumers a higher
price in one location if the existence of a lower price somewhere else
must be announced alongside it.
A sweeping price labeling law would be tantamount to treating all
price-discrimination as deceptive. Such a law deprives a seller of any
possible advantage from setting different prices across marketing
channels, even when consumers are not overly burdened by pricing
differences. Moreover, there is no compelling reason to expect that such
a law would lower prices overall. Forcing uniform prices by requiring
just as easily backfire and
complete disclosure of lowest
23 1 prices could
prices.
overall
higher
to
lead
6. Data Broker Disclosures
A different model of disclosure law can be found in the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA). 232 Among its provisions, the FCRA mandates
that firms engaged in providing "consumer reports" (as defined in the
Act) must allow people access to their records and opportunities to
correct information about them. 233 Anyone taking adverse action against
a person based on a consumer report, such as denying credit or
employment, must inform the person of this fact.2 34 The FCRA applies
narrowly only to enumerated purposes-mainly consumer credit and
235
insurance, employment screening, and a number of other uses.
However, Daniel Solove and Chris Hoofnagle make the case that
consumers should enjoy the same access, notice, opt-out, and correction
rights whenever information collected by data brokers is used.236
Similarly, FTC Commissioner Julie Brill has called upon data brokers to
provide notice, access, opt-out, and correctionprocedures to consumers,
under the "Reclaim Your Name" initiative. Taking the logic of this
approach further, retailers should also be required to disclose pricing
231.
232.

See Odlyzko 2003, supra note 6, at 366-70.
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2000).

233.
234.
235.
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236. Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection,26
U. ILL. L. REv. 357, 364-68 (2006).
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practices that attach hidden consequences to consumers' personal
information such as personalized dynamic pricing based on consumer
profiling or purchase history.
Requiring data brokers and retailers to inform consumers about the
ways they use consumer information for pricing will alert consumers to
situations where they might be subject to price discrimination.
However, it will not severely curtail the sellers' freedom to choose their
pricing strategy. Instead, retailers will need to convince an informed
public that their pricing methods are fair and sensible. Consumer
protection agencies, legislators, NGOs, and journalists are already doing
important work in this direction by investigating the ways that
consumers' personal and behavioral information is bought, sold, and
used by retailers. Demanding more transparency of these practices,
voluntarily or through government intervention, will be a welcomed
step in the right direction for consumers.
7. Lawsuits Over Finding a Lower Price
Should there be a legal cause of action for consumers who discover
they overpaid for an identical product from the same seller compared to
other similar shoppers? At least one such lawsuit, alleging that
Victoria's Secret's practice of sending catalogues with different prices
to male and female recipients amounted to mail fraud, has been rejected
in a U.S. federal court; the court even went so238far as to sanction the
plaintiffs attorney for filing a frivolous lawsuit.
Yet even if the court was right to conclude that no fraud was
committed, a similar lawsuit might find traction under another legal
theory-unconscionability. Mark Klock proposes that courts should
expand their reliance on the doctrine of unconscionability in cases of
particularly disadvantageous discriminatory prices when no
monopolization, deception or duress is involved. 3 Klock argues that,
from an economic perspective, it is impossible for a seller in a
competitive market to offer all its consumers a uniformly bad deal
unless some sort of market failure is present. 24 Only when a market
failure exists can a seller single out certain consumers and offer them
especially egregious terms without losing its entire business to
competition. I For this reason, Klock argues that courts should adopt a
new understanding of contract unconscionability as "price
238.

Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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discrimination without a cost justification. ' 242 By adopting this new
understanding of unconscionability, courts should be more willing to
invalidate contracts and order that damages be paid to disadvantaged
consumers. 24 3 In a certain sense, Klock is echoing Kant's sentiment in
the passage quoted earlier that a seller who engages in price
be suspected of exploiting the innocence of some
discrimination should
244
customers.
his
of
of
proposed interpretation
of Klock's
limitations
The
unconscionability must be acknowledged. His definition of
unconscionability encompasses nearly all forms of price discrimination,
even those not excessively burdensome to consumers and justified by
market conventions. 24 5 At the same time, the requirement that there
must be a "market failure" for a court to find that a price-discriminating
firm acted unconscionably de-fangs the rule in some cases where
consumers are disadvantaged; as we have seen, price discrimination can
have negative consequences even under ordinary imperfect competition.
Nevertheless, an economic analysis in the spirit of Klock's
understanding of unconscionability should open the door to lawsuits in
cases where consumers were given absolutely no justification or reason
for being treated worse than others.
To summarize, the norm against deception and misrepresentation
does not perfectly capture what disturbs people about price
discrimination. Free market principles would not seek to deprive sellers
of all control over their pricing by requiring them to maintain strictly
all situations. 246
equal prices or to disclose their lowest offered prices in
Even if sometime beneficial to consumers, such a strictly forced
equality would encroach too much on the private moral judgment of
sellers.
On the other hand, in the age of information-based price
discrimination, consumer autonomy cannot be understood merely as
freedom from coercion and deception. Today, as in ancient times,
selective over-pricing should be suspect. 24 7 The principle of consumer
autonomy justifies empowering consumers to know how their personal
identity and buying choices impact their position in the market. Using
the example of the FCRA, retailers and consumer data brokers should
be required to publicly disclose when and how they use personal data to
target prices to consumers, and should provide consumer with tools to

242. Id.at 376.
243. Id.379-8 1.
244. See KANT,supra note 214, at 10.
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know when the price they see is based on personal profiling. 24 8 In the
appropriate case, the victim of an especially egregious and unjustified
market treatment should have a right to sue.
E. "It is Unfair"
In classical economic thinking, there was no good reason why a
person should care what another person paid for a product. With
foundations in the liberal notion that a person is the sole judge of the
value of any product, it was imagined that each person judges the value
of goods in a vacuum. For economists, the act of a purchase at a given
price was the only true sign of the product's value to the buyer,
provided that the buyer was well-informed about the quality of the
product. 24 9 For this reason, it seemed justifiable to require the seller to
supply the consumer with accurate information about the product, but
there is no need to supply information about what other people are
paying. Yet as economists began to take a greater interest in the
psychological aspects of consumer behavior, they noticed that buyers
judge their own value of a transaction largely based on what others have
paid. 250 The question of consumer price valuation, it seems, is
intricately connected with the consumer's perception of the fairness of
the transaction relative to other buyers.25 '
Accusations of unfairness have been voiced particularly strongly
against targeted dynamic pricing.2 52 Commenting on the revelation of
Amazon's online dynamic pricing experiment in 2000, economist Paul
Krugman wrote, "dynamic pricing is also undeniably unfair: some
253
people pay more just because of who they are."
1. Understanding Pricing Unfairness
Unfairness can be a challenging concept. It involves the human
desire to be treated with respect and decency, and the indignation of
being misjudged, mistreated, and ignored. Whereas deception and
misrepresentation cause clear consumer harm when they deny the buyer
248.

See, e.g., supra Part IlI.D.6.

249. This assumes that the shopper generally has information about the price she pays.
This generalization should be qualified with pricing practices that make it difficult for
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the expected benefit of the bargain, unfair treatment evokes the buyer's
outrage, even if no measurable harm has occurred.
In recent decades, economists and cognitive scientists have tried to
better understand what makes individuals perceive pricing schemes as
unfair. They consider unfairness usually as a subjective judgment of the
buyer that a certain process or outcome is unreasonable, unacceptable,
or unjust. 254 The unfairness of the price is judged in comparison with

prices offered to other buyers in similar situations. 255 A judgment of
unfairness is generally associated with negative feelings such as unease
or guilt when the inequality is to the buyer's advantage, or outrage and
anger when the inequality is to the buyer's disadvantage. 256 Although
the comparative judgment is made relative to other buyers, negative
emotions associated with unfairness are directed toward the party seen
as having caused the unfair situation-usually the seller. 2" 7 Studies
show that buyers' perceptions of unfairness are highly influenced by the
context and degree of similarity between a buyer's transaction and other
comparable transactions.258
Researches have proposed various theories to describe the ways that
buyers compare their transactions. Under "equity theories" of
unfairness, buyers focus on the distribution of benefits between buyer
and seller.2 59 Under "procedure theories" of unfairness, buyers focus on
the procedure by which price is set. 260 Under the "dual entitlement"
theory, buyers presumably adjudicate the fairness of a transaction based
on the positions of both buyer and seller-the transaction is perceived
as fair if the buyer receives her entitlement to the terms of the reference
and the seller receives his entitlement to his reference
transaction
261
point.
Perceptions of fairness are also influenced by various other factors,
among them, the perceived reasons for the differences in price, the
ongoing relationship of trust between buyers and sellers, and the social
norms of a particular market. 262 The effects of violating norms of
fairness are just as varied. Experiments with the "ultimatum game" have
demonstrated that buyers are frequently willing to punish a seller and
walk away from otherwise beneficial transactions when they perceive
254. Lan Xia et al., The Price is Unfair! A Conceptual Framework of Price Fairness
Perceptions,68 J. MKTG. 1, 1 (2004).
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the offer as unfair. 263 Buyers who encounter unfair prices sometimes
take no action but subjectively lower the value of the product in their
own eyes and report dissatisfaction, disappointment and outrage toward
the seller. 264 Buyers may take action by complaining or demanding a
refund, and may protect themselves from future disappointment by
quitting the seller or acquiring more information in advance. 2" They
may also retaliate against the seller by switching to 266
a competitor or
spreading negative opinions and reviews of the product.
Not surprisingly, those who pay a comparatively higher price report
stronger negative feelings of unfairness than those who pay lower
prices. 267 Consumers who face a take-it-or-leave-it price by the seller
are more likely to complain of unfairness than those who are given an
opportunity to self-select the price level they pay from a menu of
options. 268 The period of time between offered prices is an important
factor, too-frequent price changes create a sense of unfairness while
transactions set more than
a month apart are almost never compared as
269
reference transactions.
Fair process, not just fair outcome, is important too. Buyers are more
likely to view a price difference as fair if they understand the reasons
for the difference and are offered a choice of pricing options, like
signing up for a store loyalty card or agreeing to receive coupons.27 ° On
the other hand, consumers are particularly enraged by pricing
differences that appear arbitrary, or worse-prices that appear to be
entirely an exploitation of market power
or the seller's knowledge of the
27 1
buyer's highest willingness to pay.
A survey of attitudes towards various price discrimination practices
gives added support to the theories of price unfairness.1 72 In total, 91%
of the survey's respondents thought that it is unjust for a supermarket to
charge separate individuals differently, and an equal percentage thought
it was unjust for a store to charge them based on what the store knew
263. See Kahneman et al., supra note 261, at 736.
264. Xia et al., supranote 254, at 7-8.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Spiekermann, supra note 250, at 4.
268. Kelly L. Haws & William 0. Bearden, Dynamic Pricing and Consumer Fairness
Perceptions,33 J. CONSUMER RES. 304, 307-09 (2006).
269. Id. at 306; Spiekermann, supra note 250, at 2.
270. Kannan & Kopalle, supra note 6, at 71-73, 79 (describing several forms of nonarbitrary price discrimination based on systems such as customer loyalty, coupons, and changes
in the availability of goods that have been shown to cause less negative reaction among
consumers).
271. See Spiekermann, supra note 250, at 2; see also Kahneman et al., supra note 261, at
734-36.
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Turow et al., supra note 36, at 3, 22-23.
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about them. 273 Accordingly, 87% of respondents thought that it was
wrong to charge different people different prices online for the same
product during the same hour; 84% thought that websites ought to
inform customers if they engaged in discriminatory pricing; 76% said
that it would bother them to learn that other people pay less for the same
that
products; and 64% responded that it would bother them to learn
274
other people get better discount coupons for the same products.
2. Unfairness and Trust
Trust is a necessary condition of risk-taking in commercial
relationships. Unfair treatment leads to a breakdown of the trust that a
buyer places in a seller. A good definition of trust, in the context of
organizational relations, is "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable
to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of
the ability to monitor or control that other party." 275 This definition
serves well for an understanding of consumer trust in sellers. Buyers
allow sellers to identify them and reveal personal information through
their repeated interaction will the seller, and do not expect to be
adversely treated because of that disclosure of information. Consumers
do not usually take special pains to verify whether the seller has secretly
discriminated among its customers. Trust is built slowly through the
interactions of buyers and sellers, and relies on the norms and practices
of particular retail contexts. Those expectations of trust are frustrated
when loyal customers in ongoing commercial relationships are treated
as second-rate customers and are not offered the lowest prices by the
seller. 2 76 With trust broken on a wide scale, we can expect a
marketplace of circumspect and risk-averse shoppers, who will be less
willing to enter into commercial relationships. 27 The repercussions
could ripple through the market beyond reckoning.

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Roger C. Mayer et al., An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust, 20 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 709, 712 (1995).

276. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 190, at 30. Fisher remarked that some of the harshest
complaints that price discrimination is unfair are voiced when firms appear to "punish" loyal
customers. Id.For example, Amazon's pricing experiment in 2000 especially enraged its repeat
customers. Id. at 11-12. Similarly, a number of years earlier, loyal Microsoft customers were
incensed when the company charged existing customers the same price to upgrade MS Word to
version 2.0 as it charged buyers of competing brands to switch to the same product. See id.at
30.
277. See Odlyzko 2003, supranote 6, at 355.
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3. Remedying Unfairness: Self-Regulation of the Market
If unfairness is a matter of personal judgment, should government or
the courts step in to regulate at all? Consumers are often in the best
position to punish retailers who treat them unfairly.2 78 Naturally,
retailers would be wise not to alienate and disappoint their customers. It
stands to reason that retailers will avoid irksome pricing strategies that
offer short-term gains but end up hurting their business in the long run.
As the strong negative reaction to Amazon's dynamic pricing
experiment in 2000 has shown, vocal consumer outrage can be a
powerful deterrent against repeating similar practices.279 The public's
dislike of unfairness, even in the face of other benefits, is likely to be a
powerful 28factor that will limit the spread of price-discrimination
strategies. 0
Any attempt at regulation in the name of fairness would find it
difficult to define in advance which kinds of practices are inherently
unfair. The practices that consumers tend to accept as fair are rooted in
highly contextual social conventions, not universal principles. Personal
judgments of unfairness often take into account multiple factors to
decide which transaction are comparable, which procedures are just, and
which outcomes are equitable. The difficulty of defining unfairness in
the abstract is a significant counter-argument
against adopting sweeping
2
market regulations on those grounds. 91
4. Technological Solutions for Monitoring Price Discrimination
Technological tools might help individuals monitor retailers' pricing
practices. The research team of Mikians et al. suggests that their
experimental simulated online identities could be adapted to serve as a
watchdog tool for consumers to monitor when retailers are engaging in
any form of online price discrimination. 282 Journalists have already used
283
this kind of tool in the course of investigating price discrimination.
Other technologies could also allow consumers to avoid price
discrimination by allowing them to shop anonymously or with a fake
278. See Edwards, supra note 109, at 583.
279. See id. at 583-85.
280. Odlyzko 2003, supra note 6, at 357-58, 364-64.
281. See Edwards, supra note 109, at 589-91; Fisher, supra note 190, at 28-31;
SPIEKERMANN, supra note 250, at 5-6 (discussing the subjective nature of "fairness
perception"); see also KLOCK, supra note 36, at 359-63 (discussing the difficulties of extending
the Robinson-Patman Act to the service market in addition to the consumer goods market).
282. Mikians et al., supra note 35, at 84.
283. E.g., Jeremy Singer-Vine et al., How the Journal Tested Prices and Deals Online,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2012, at Al, availableat http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/12/23/how-thejournal-tested-prices-and-deals-online/.
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identity. 2 84 These tools allow consumers to respond to surreptitious,
targeted pricing practices they find most unfair by replacing blind trust
with vigilant suspicion and taking personal protective steps against
discrimination.
5. Remedying Unfairness through Government Regulation
Yet even with individual consumer action and technological tools,
we can expect that a certain portion of unscrupulous sellers would
continue to employ unfair pricing practices. A wasteful technological
arms race between sellers and buyers might ensue. If so, should
government regulators sometime intervene against unfair pricing?
The regulatory power of the Federal Trade Commission extends to
unfair business practices 285 but it has been reluctant to use that power
against price discrimination practices. Mark MacCarthy argues that the
FTC should expand its reliance on its "unfairness" mandate to curtail a
variety of harmful information practices, including consumer price
discrimination. 286 He argues that public regulation based on the
unfairness standard is appropriate to prevent the kind of information
harms that currently are not addressed under a privacy paradigm built
upon consumer notice and consent. 2 87 This approach comports with the
scope of the FTC's enforcement authority, which is limited to acts that
are "likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
outweighed by
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not288
competition.
to
or
consumers
to
benefits
countervailing
The meaning of the term "unfairness" in the FTC Act is very
different than that used by behavioral economists. The Act makes the
meaning of "unfair" very close to that of "deceptive." 28 9 Still,
MacCarthy's argument is a persuasive call for regulatory intervention
284.
285.
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against unfair retail practices that consumers can't easily detect or
avoid. The recent FTC action against "history sniffing" by ad networks
290
is a good start, even if it is connected only indirectly to retail pricing.
To summarize, some price discrimination practices can seem
patently unfair, especially when done surreptitiously against consumers
who are not given reason or explanation of the treatment they are given.
Improved technological abilities to price discriminate create greater
temptations for sellers to violate the consumer's trust and act in ways
they may perceive as unfair. This sense of unfairness can break down
the trust of buyers in sellers. The marketplace might correct itself, and
technical tools could allow consumers to monitor seller's prices,
obviating the need for regulation. But when this fails to happen,
especially in those instances when unfair pricing practices are difficult
to detect, the FTC ought to use its existing "unfairness" mandate
judiciously to restore trust in the market.
F. "It is Socially Unjust"
The idea of social justice is very different from the harm principle or
fairness. Instead of looking at the individual transaction, the concept of
social justice looks at the persistent harms to society over time. It has
less to do with the equity between buyer and seller, and more to do with
the way the price advantages and disadvantages are distributed to
different consumer groups in society.
1. Walzer's "Spheres of Justice"
Philosopher Michael Walzer's argues 29 1 that just distributions of
goods follow different criteria in different social spheres of human
activity. Cars and haircuts can be bought for money, but political office
should not. Food stamps are given according to need, but graduate
degrees are not. Distributional Justice is not about achieving a wide
distribution of goods approximating "simple equality". Rather, it is
making sure that different goods are distributed appropriately in a
"complex equality." Injustices arise when dominance in one sphere of
social activity subverts the distributional criteria of goods in other social
spheres and entrenches itself in the social structure. Power becomes
tyranny; dominance becomes monopoly; social capital becomes a
stultified cast system.
290. Federal Trade Commission, supra note 77. However, the FTC explains that its action
against the practice of "History Sniffing" was based on its mandate to act against deceptive,
rather than unfair, practices.
291. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 330 (1983), discussed in NISSENBAUM, supra note 2, at 166-69.
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With respect to the sphere of commerce, Walzer argues that although
money can buy a great many things, there are certain goods deemed to
be beyond its proper reach-human servitude, political power, the
outcomes of trials, basic rights and freedoms. With few exceptions,
almost all other goods can be bought for money and the free market is a
just mechanism for allocating those goods in society. The price system
is an appropriate means for people to assign value to the goods and
services they exchange in order achieve their own ends. Thus, free
exchange of goods for a known price is the only just way to reward
initiative, labor, talent, and risk-taking with the goods that each person
seeks.292
When discussing the social justice of price discrimination, we are
not talking about the distribution of products or services as such. Rather,
we are discussing the distribution of price advantages and
disadvantages-the opportunities to buy the same product at a discount
or exclusion from those opportunities. Price discrimination challenges
the idea of free market exchange as a just distributional criterion for
goods in the market sphere because it distorts the price system. To
understand this challenge, it is useful to think of price advantages in two
ways: as a commodity acquired in free exchange or as a subversion of
the free market mechanism itself.
2. A Bad Deal-The Payoffs for Disclosing Personal Information for
Price Advantages
Price advantages can be thought of as a kind of market commodity.
However, it is plain to see that they are usually not bought for money.
In most cases, price advantages are given in exchange for personal
information about consumers.
With the rapid growth of online marketing beginning in the 1990s,
some scholars became troubled by the fact that personal privacy was
eroding and the risks of data insecurity were increasing as retailers, ad
networks, and consumer data brokers were learning to make billions of
dollars from the collection and trade of consumer information.
Consumers relinquish private information whenever they make a credit
card purchase, use a store rewards card, agree to receive coupons, query
search engines, use free e-mail services, surf for entertainment or
information, or engage in social media. While consumers benefit from
these free services, they do not receive direct compensation for the use
of their information. These scholars view the unequal costs to
consumers versus the benefits to large firms as a market failure, a sign
that the market for personal information is inefficient. This inequality is
292.

Id. at 95-108.
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seen as a problem of social cost in which the harms of eroded privacy
and growing insecurity are negative externalities imposed on consumers
as a consequence
of the free-for-all attitude towards personal
293
information.
A proposed answer for these scholars is to view personal information
as a form of property-something that an individual should be free to
withhold or exchange for value.
Through a combination of legal
protections, default rules, and technical tools, consumers could easily
grant permission to their data and reap a just share of the rewards. The
problem of online privacy would be solved. In fact, a number of
companies are attempting to do precisely that, by creating "vaults" for
individuals to control and capitalize on their personal data.
Without engaging with the broader claims of this argument, the idea
of a property right in personal information assumes that consumers can
get a good deal from sharing their information, at least in theory. If
consumers sell their information to advertisers, so the argument goes,
they would happily enjoy free services, receive only ads and coupons
that are relevant to them, and might even make a small profit. Everyone
would win.
But if the relinquishment of personal information leads instead to
disadvantages in pricing, could the market compensate a person for
subjecting herself to adverse price treatment?
If the advantages and disadvantages of price discrimination are
distributed equally throughout society, it is conceivable that consumers
win some and lose some from the disclosure of information to retailers,
but are better off overall. However, if certain individuals are regularly
identified as low-value customers and suffer repeated disadvantages in
the marketplace, then no amount of commercially viable compensation
could ever make up for the harm they suffer. By surrendering their
information, some individuals put themselves at a constant disadvantage
while making others better off. For those individuals, providing
personal information to facilitate price discrimination is always a losing
proposition.
293.
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3. The Problem of Adverse Selection
Viewing price advantages as a commodity is also susceptible to the
problem of adverse selection. If only the individuals who expect to gain
an advantage share their information with sellers, then all the rest have
no escape from the negative consequences, even if they themselves
never bargained away their personal information.
The problem of adverse selection is demonstrated in the practice of
supermarket loyalty cards, which offer lower prices to self-selected
customers who get the card, while non-card-holders must pay full-price.
All customers are free to acquire the cards, but the benefits of these
cards only accrue to high-value customers who make large purchases.
Supermarkets will sometimes offer special discounts on higher-end
luxury products in order to garner the loyalty of high-value customers,
while at the same time raising prices on staple items that are preferred
by low-value customers. The less affluent customers end up paying
more for basic products, and often have few other choices in their area.
This has been criticized as a cross-subsidy of the wealthy by those
296 of
lesser means-essentially "paying the wealthy for being wealthy."
These kinds of loyalty discounts discourage more aggressive
competition for customers and raise average prices overall. The term
"loyalty discount" can lead to an increase in price to all consumers,
including loyal ones. 297 In this way, the exchange of consumer
information for price advantages can end up regularly disadvantaging
one group of consumers through the voluntary sharing of information
by another group of consumers.
4. Price Discrimination and Social Sorting
Viewing the collection of consumer information as a voluntary
exchange for free services and commercial benefits ignores the reality
that the vast majority of information on consumers in the hand of
retailers and data brokers comes from sources over which the consumer
has no knowledge, control, or way to opt-out. It is therefore misleading
to think of the market advantages as the benefit of a free bargain. In
most cases, it is more accurate to think of it as an involuntary distortion
of the price system of value allocation.
"'[M]y money is as good as anyone else's' has been a common
American expression, but that may no longer be true," 298 warns Joseph
296. Amanda Conley & Laura Moy, Paying the Wealthy for Being Wealthy: Why We
Should Care About Information Privacy Even if We Have 'Nothing to Hide' (2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
297.
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Turow. This statement sums up the fear that with price discrimination,
market treatment is no longer tied the money in a person's pocket. It is
Krugman's patently unfair299condition where "some people pay more just
because of who they are."
The effects of social sorting are especially apparent in price
discrimination practices such as individualized dynamic pricing and
targeted coupons, which identify, profile, and sort individual customers.
These practices demonstrate the financial motivations that lead
businesses to sort consumers as a means of allowing them to attract the
choicest customers (the "strong market") and exclude low-value
consumers (the "weak market"). If people suffer repeated disadvantages
because of personal attributes over the long run, such practices might
create a market divided between a class of consumers who receive
incentives and offers for the best products and services, and a class of
consumers who are habitually ignored, underserved, and over-charged.
This is especially true because a large part of the information provided
by consumer data brokers pertains to persistent qualities, such as the
neighborhood consumers live in, their income level, and their level of
education. If this information is used to price discriminate, we may
reasonably assume that the same individuals will routinely suffer the
same treatment across different sellers.
Because of the effects of "symmetrical' and "asymmetrical"
competition structures, two kinds of results are likely to occur. In some
instances, those tagged as "weak market" consumers will be routinely
ignored and excluded across the market. In other instances, the market
will bifurcate into stores that cater exclusively to separate consumer
groups. The common middle ground will tend to shrink in either case.
These effects could be accentuated if discrimination is based on
consumers' purchase history. When this is the case, choices become
destiny, and consumers' past purchases will continually reinforce their
respective advantages and disadvantages.
The polarizing tendency of price discrimination is already beginning
to appear in the U.S. market. Stores are targeting ever-narrower
segments of the consumer population. Discount supermarkets like WalMart appeal especially to price-sensitive shoppers, while chains like
Whole Foods cater to a more affluent clientele. Elsewhere, stores' sales
staff lavishes personal attention on preferred, high-value customers
while lower value customers routinely face long wait times for customer
service and indifferent attention from staff. The division among
consumer niches reaches price treatment, too. In department stores like
Bloomingdales, preferred customers receive special offers, advance
information about sales events that match their buying profile coupons,
299.
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and special discounts at the point of sale (these practices are sometimes
called "pre-selling" or "clientelling"). Other stores actively try to
dissuade low-value customers who only shop at sales (known to
retailers as "cherry-pickers") by adopting stricter rules on returns and
items and promotions that are
price-matching and by discontinuing
300
favored by low-value customers.
Over twenty years ago, philosopher Oscar Gandy described the logic
that underlies the complex web of technologies that determine the
treatment of individuals in consumer markets as the "panoptic sort".
Gandy pointed out that the technologies involved in social sorting are
especially adept at avoiding individuals classified as risky or poor
investments, rather than realizing social gains. Their effect is to
victimize through avoidance of certain groups of people, who are
persistently disfavored because of their race, gender, age, class, culture,
and consciousness. 30 1 This exclusion goes beyond the mere
disadvantages of not having enough money to pay, and amounts to an
entrenchment of social classes already victim to past biases.
Helen Nissenbaum emphasized that the outrage over sorting comes
from the feeling that individuals are held unreasonably or unfairly
accountable for past behavior or social status. 30 2 Important decisions
about individuals' market standing are made without the guarantee of
transparency, non-arbitrariness and relevant criteria. Consumer
information brokers are particularly susceptible to this objection, since
they take into consideration information that has little to do with past
market behavior as indicators of future market choices. For
Nissenbaum, the crux of the problem seems to be that assemblages of
information about consumers are used to sort consumers in ways that
are manipulative, paternalistic, and non-transparent. 303 These sorting
techniques reflect the power disparity between the strong market actors
and the much weaker consumers.304
There is certainly a deep connection between non-transparent,
secretive and heavy-handed pricing practices and the unjust allocation
of price advantages. Marketing decisions are never explained to
consumers, and the value judgments embodied in the algorithms of
consumer profiling technologies are never explicitly stated. Social
injustice thrives in this kind of opaqueness-an unjust pricing system is
far less likely if retailers needed to publically answer to the individuals
they exclude.
300.
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5. Is Social Sorting so Bad?
Some scholars disagree that new sorting technologies are inherently
unjust. Lior Strahilavitz has argued (in the context of decisions such as
employment, housing, jury selection, and immigration) that accepting
"statistical" forms of discrimination based on analysis of factually
accurate personal information might be preferable to "animus-based"
discrimination against racial minorities.
Placing a "curtain" over
personal information may lead decision-makers to rely on the old
sorting standbys of race, gender, and age. 30 6 Strahilevitz stresses that
price discrimination based on statistical analysis can sometimes have
positive effects. 30 7 Far from consistently disadvantaging the already
disadvantaged, price discrimination sometimes allows poorer consumers
access to products30 8at a discounted price that would not otherwise be
available to them.
Similarly, Matthew Edwards argues that the injustices of price
discrimination are best addressed by continuing existing policies for
combating normatively disfavored wealth transfers and discrimination
based on race, gender, age or disability,
rather than attempt to achieve
39
strict price equality for all consumers.
These positions seem unsatisfying. The allocation of pricing
advantages and disadvantages respectively to "high value" and "low
value" consumers can be done without regard to race, gender, age, and
still persistently disadvantage identifiable classes of consumers.
Selective treatment for higher prices, worse service, and fewer
opportunities adds a special sting to poverty. While unintentional, these
judgments tend to align with forms of "invidious" discrimination. It
may be true that when this happens, other retailers might choose to cater
especially to the price-conscious shoppers with new discount options.310
The result is an increasingly divided market. Stores and brands become
closely identified with a specific kind of clientele and the wide common
ground quickly vanishes. It is one thing when people are treated
differently in the market as a result of their different buying power; it is
another thing entirely when people are treated differently as a result of
deliberate data-driven judgments by the sellers about the kind of people
their clients are.
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6. A Call for Public Debate
A divided marketplace can have unpleasant consequences. Joseph
Turow warns that increased reliance on niche marketing will lead to3 a1
"new culture of suspicion and envy" among classes of consumers.
Although the social injustice is not the fault of any single seller, the
market as a whole will suffer the cumulative outcome of the choices of
retailers, even if they are sometimes pressed out of competitive
necessity to adopt price discrimination technologies.
Adopting a cautious attitude toward price discrimination does not
3 12 of the
necessarily mean a "rigidly enforced consumer equality rule"
kind Matthew Edwards decries. Indeed, any such rigid rule would be
premature. But to dismiss the concerns over social injustice is
dangerously complacent. At present, more empirical research is needed
to determine the extent to which price advantages and disadvantages are
distributed unequally and persistently among consumer groups.
Although there is reason to believe that price discrimination is
contributing to widening social gaps in the United States and elsewhere,
better evidence is needed to support this conclusion. It is likely that the
effects on society vary among different sectors of the economy and that
many factors affect the distribution of price advantages. These should
receive more serious study than the scope of this Article allows.
Greater public accountability is needed from the consumer data and
marketing industries. People are entitled to know when their personal
information goes into pricing decisions and how those determinations
are reached. There needs to be a public debate about the legitimate
tradeoffs between information disclosure and market advantages, and
the kinds of personal information that should never be used to allocate
market advantages.
To summarize, consumers might sometimes benefit from the bargain
of personal information in exchange for price advantages, at least in
theory. However, consumers have no real way to assess whether they
are getting sufficient value for the information they relinquish. What's
more, other consumers could end up suffering persistent price
disadvantages through adverse selection.
In many cases, however, price advantages are not exchanged for
freely given information. Rather, they are the result of technologies of
social sorting in the hands of retailers. The allocation of advantage is
done far from the scrutiny of the consumers they sort and profile. There
is good reason to suspect that price discrimination based on consumer
profiling consistently disadvantages certain groups but the full extent of
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this phenomenon needs to be empirically studied.
To the extent it is happening, the allocation according to the buyer
sorting and profiling challenges the liberal idea of the market as a just
mechanism for the free exchange of valuable goods among individuals.
Goods that ought to be freely allocated to anyone willing to pay their
price are in fact being allocated, to some degree, according to the
personal circumstances and identities of different buyers. As this trend
grows, the social sphere of commerce is likely to become more divided
and a "culture of suspicion and envy" could result. If this future is to be
avoided, the public must engage in dialogue over the social
consequences that result from the opaque allocation of price advantages
in the market.
CONCLUSION

Proponents of information age marketing sometimes argue that their
methods reproduce the close personal relationships that consumers used
to enjoy with their trusted local shopkeepers in days gone by.313 This is
a rosy and unrealistic picture of how technology is changing the market.
In truth, the human faces of the new marketing industry would probably
resemble those of the salesmen
in David Mamet's play and subsequent
3 14
film Glengarry Glen Ross.
In the play, four salesmen in a struggling real-estate agency are
pitted in a cruel sales contest against each other. The office manager,
Williamson, will not give the salesmen the good "leads"-the names of
likely buyers purchased from a commercial data broker. To earn the
good leads, they must close sales, but to close sales, they need the good
leads. The desperate salesmen are driven to beg, lie, and steal in order to
keep their jobs. In a moving scene, down-on-his-luck salesman Shelly
Levene, pleads with Williamson: "Do I want charity? Do I want pity? I
want sits. I want leads that don't come right out of a phone book. Give
me a lead hotter than that, I'll go in and close it. Give me a chance.
That's all I want ...,315
The desire to make sales is human. A business that cannot find and
attract its best customers is doomed to be crushed by the unforgiving
competition. But that desire can corrupt those who will stop at nothing
to reach prospective buyers and extract high prices from them. The
marketing practices that have become possible by the rapid advances in
information technology do not always deserve our sympathies.
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Table 1, below, summarizes the crosscutting interactions between
pricing practices, information needs, gathering methods, and the ethical
concerns they create.
Table 1
Price
Discrimination
Type
"Perfect" first
degree price
discrimination
[Unlikely to succeed
in reality]

Possible Ethical
Concerns

How Sellers get
Information

What Firms want
to know

Identify consumers
by login, payment
card, loyalty cards,
cookies, or IP
address.
Collect and mine
consumers' purchase
history, demographic data, tastes,
preferences, and
shopping habits
from data brokers.

9 Identify
individuals
a Assess
individuals' willingness to pay.

.

0
0
0

Second degree price
discrimination
Loyalty cards,
quantity discounts,
two-part tariff,
Versioning, bundling.

Quantity/quality
demand dispersion and price
elasticity among
strong and weak
markets.
Competitive
structure (symmetry/asymmetry)

*

*

Mining consumer
purchase histories.
Perform price
experiments,

0

0

Possible monopolylike wealth extraction
nearing consumers'
highest willingness to
pay would lead to
lower consumer
welfare across the
board.
Increases insecurity
and erodes privacy
Unfair treatment of
consumers.
Socially unjust
allocation of price
advantages, if the
same individuals are
persistently
disadvantaged.
Risk of
anticompetitive
effects (if sufficient
market power exists).
Socially unjust, if
allocation of benefits
to self-selected
groups creates
persistent
disadvantages through
adverse selection.
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Price
What Firms want
Discrimination
to know
Type
Third degree price * Identify
discrimination
individual or
Location-based
group demographdiscrimination;
ic trait,
"Rough-and-ready"
* Dispersion of
emographic profiling,
price sensitivities
between groups.
o Competitive
structure (symmetry/asymmetry)
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How Sellers get
Information
Identify consumers
by login, payment
card, loyalty cards,
cookies, IP address,
or other tracking
tools.
o Use demographic
indicators such as
browser or OS type.
* Request
demographic
information directly
from users.
* Acquire basic
demographic
information about
consumers from
*

Possible Ethical
Concerns
*
*

0

Possibly lowers
consumer welfare
Increases insecurity
and erosion of
privacy.
Socially unjust, if it
persistently
disadvantages certain
groups based on
inherent and
irrelelvant traits such
as race, age, sex, etc.

brokers.

Price
based
on * Identify
purchase history
consumers
Loyalty
discounts, * Recognize strong
introductory offers,
and weak markets.
* Competitive
structure (symmetry/asymmetry)

*

Consumer profiling * Identify
using
aggregated
individuals
data
* Assess
[e.g. from consumer
individuals'
data brokers]
willingness to
Personalized
pay.
dynamic posted
* Discover
prices; targeted
switching costs,
coupon; product
tastes, search
customization.
costs.
* Competitive
structure (symmetry/asymmetry)

9 Identify consumers
by login, payment
card, loyalty cards,
cookies, IP address,
or other tracking
tools.
e Acquire and mine
consum-ers'
purchase history
across industries,
o Acquire information
on consumer
demographic data,

Collect and mine
consumers' purchase
histories held by the
seller itself.
o Offer introductory
offers or loyalty
discounts.
* Perform price

*

*

Could lower overall
social welfare or
consumer welfare.
Unfair treatment of
consumers

experiments.

tastes, preferences,

*

*

*

Overall welfare
decrease due to
competition
inefficiencies,
prisoner's dilemma,
and non-welfareenhancing
competition.
Increases insecurity
and erosion of
privacy.
Raises search costs
for lower available

prices.
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Price
Discrimination
Type

Pricing based on •
search cost and
obfuscation
price
("noise")

What Firms want
to know

Correlation
between certain
human traits and a
higher search cost.

Possible Ethical
Concerns

How Sellers get
Information
and shop-ping habits
from public records.
o Track online and
offline activity and
habits.
* Aggregate and mine
information to create
fine-grained profiles
and e-scores.

@ Unfair treatment of
consumers.
0 Socially unjust
allocation of price
advantages if
persistently
disadvantages the
same individuals or
groups.

o Offer occasional
discounts, coupons,
etc.
o Engage in dynamic
pricing,
9 Vary prices across
marketing channels.
o Offer coupons to
likeliest strong
market.
9 Discriminate in
favor of pricecomparison
websites.
o Offer discounts only
to customers who

0

Lowers consumer
welfare.
0 Raises search costs
for lower available
prices.
Unfair treatment of
.
consumers.
0 Socially unjust
allocation of price
advantages if the
same individuals or
groups persistently
suffer higher search
costs.

haggle or complain.

The discourse over price discrimination must consider how different
practices require different kinds of information, and in turn, raise
different ethical concerns. Price discrimination is not one single
practice-it is many. Although the general context of discussion is retail
marketing, there are many particular shopping contexts. Purchasing
from a giant online retailer like Amazon is not the same as browsing at
a local boutique; shopping for groceries at a supermarket is not like
buying a car. Each setting is governed by different norms, relationships,
and expectations.
Price discrimination practices can cause a variety of harms. More
and more sellers are experimenting with price discrimination practices.
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This trend may lead to lower prices and better choices for consumers.
But it may also cause some consumers to suffer from higher prices and
fewer choices. Consumers are likely to bear the costs of lost privacy and
greater information insecurity. The market as a whole could suffer as
competing firms are caught in a prisoner's dilemma and forced to invest
in costly technologies and non-welfare-enhancing competition for
fleeting market advantages.
When consumers are treated unfairly, they feel outrage and lose their
trust in retailers. In the long run, price discrimination could lead to
unjust social consequences if individuals or groups suffer persistent
disadvantages.
Certain kinds of information needed for price discrimination to
succeed were not available in the past, or were prohibitively expensive
to acquire and slow to apply. New technologies have radically altered
the ability of retailers to price discriminate, and have created new ways
to do so.
Technologies for identifying consumers have made price
discrimination more feasible by allowing firms to easily tarket
individuals while making it more difficult for them to remain
anonymous and hide relevant traits and habits. It has become easier to
engage in dynamic pricing and to vary prices across marketing channels
in order to take advantage of differences in search costs between the
shoppers; indeed, these new pricing methods even frustrate the savviest
consumers sometimes. The ability to record and analyze past shopping
behavior makes it easier to differentiate among shoppers based on their
purchase history. This is not merely a change in degree from old
marketing practices; it represents a different kind of commercial
environment that requires a rethinking of favorable attitudes toward
price discrimination.
One of the most dramatic changes from past practices is the new
ability to aggregate unfathomable amounts of data. Consumer data
brokers are a multi-billion dollar industry that provides retailers with an
intimate profile of nearly every U.S. citizen. Data aggregation makes it
possible to price discriminate based on consumer purchase history and
segment shoppers to narrow and specific categories. It also allows
retailers to design their price structures and promotions much more
efficiently. Although it is unclear how this ability is being applied in
practice, the predictive power of data mining already has many people
imaging the day when retailers will be able to guess each shopper's
highest willingness-to-pay, bringing to reality nightmarish scenarios. At
present, this possibility seems remote, but the future potential of data
mining technologies for pricing is anyone's guess.
Data aggregation is also responsible for some of the gravest concerns
over privacy. Statistical algorithms judge the buying power of

WHATDO WE WORRYABOUT WHEN WE WORRYABOUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION?

consumers based on factors such as age, marital status, children, home
ownership, and address-factors one cannot easily change. Aggregators
also consider habits and opinions that ordinary people would see as
irrelevant or inappropriate for the allocation of commercial advantages.
If aggregators take into consideration past shopping behavior, then
present judgments about buyers' likely actions become a self-fulfilling
prophecy. All of this strikes people as patently unfair.
The concern that data-driven price discrimination reinforces social
advantages and disadvantages is a very different from the individual
welfare harms and unfairness complaints. The impact of pricing
methods on social justice is cumulative and operates on society as a
whole, rather than particular to individual transactions. This impact
should be closely monitored.
Many pricing practices depend on keeping them secret from
consumers. Some practices--dynamic pricing, differential pricing
across marketing channels, and discrimination based URL or browser
type-depend on consumers not knowing that they are subject to price
discrimination at all. When discovered, such pricing methods make
consumers feel cheated. Other practices, like targeted coupons, are
cloaked in an air of "it's-just-business" statistical value-neutrality while
consumers are left guessing as to which segments of society benefits
from them most. Secrecy also enshrouds the robust trade in consumer
personal information, as we have seen. 316 Terms are buried in arcane
privacy policies, if they are available at all. By contrast, price
discrimination practices conducted openly raise far fewer and more
remote concerns. Effects on competition and social may remain.
However, these methods are accepted and favored by most shoppers.
Secrecy harms consumers. Control over one's personal information
is meaningless without the ability to understand the consequences of
information sharing. The secrecy of pricing decisions contributes to the
popular feeling that they are deceptive, harmful to consumers, and
unfair. The social injustices and market harms that are caused by price
discrimination go untreated because public scrutiny is unavailable. This
must change. Price discrimination has become a matter of serious public
concern. The public is entitled to answers from the companies that buy
and sell their information.
4. Remedies
The variety of contexts, pricing practices, and possible harms,
converge when it comes to those practices that are criticized as most
obnoxious to consumers. Targeted and dynamic pricing methods, driven
316. Supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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by vast amounts of aggregated personal information, and carried out
surreptitiously without opportunity for consumers to self-select, are also
the most likely to be harmful, deceptive, unfair, and socially unjust.
Remedies must fit the expected harms. Some of the harms can be
treated by pinpoint solutions-antitrust laws against monopolization
and restraints of competition; private lawsuits over outrightly deceptive
pricing; anti-discrimination laws to combat prices that are flagrantly
based on nationality, race, religion, or gender; bans on data collection
that violates established principles of privacy.
More generally, redressing the problems of unfair and deceptive
pricing requires that consumers become better informed. This can be
achieved if government and the media insist that retailers and data
brokers come clean about their pricing practices. More specific duties of
disclosure to consumers merit consideration but require a serious debate
over the legitimate limits of sellers' information advantages.
There are also good grounds to consider placing certain limits on the
collection of consumer personal information by retailers and data
brokers. Although consumers can protect themselves with anonymizing
technologies and price-comparison sites, it might be socially preferable
to impose government regulation instead of a wasteful technological
arms race. However, sweeping bans on the collection of consumer
information would be unwise and overly restrictive of the free market.
Pinpoint restrictions on certain collection methods (like the "history
sniffing" case), and bans on kinds of information that should never be
part of pricing decisions deserve case-by-case consideration.
The problem of unchecked price discrimination has taken its place
among the pressing issues of the information age. It is time for
politicians, regulators, the marketing industry and the public to respond
to the challenge with appropriate and principled policies.

